Health and Social Care Bill — Committee (9th Day) (Continued)

– in the House of Lords at 8:28 pm on 30 November 2011.

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Votes in this debate

Amendment 156

Moved by Baroness Thornton

156: Clause 22, page 29, line 2, at end insert-

"( ) Subsection (1) shall not apply to any providers who have any financial interest, directly or indirectly, in the provision of any service that the clinical commissioning group may be required to commission."

Photo of Baroness Thornton Baroness Thornton Shadow Spokesperson (Health), Shadow Spokesperson (Equalities and Women's Issues) 8:41, 30 November 2011

My Lords, I also speak to my other amendments in this group. Over supper my noble friend reminded me that the late lamented Lord Carter, a previous Government Chief Whip, used to say to Ministers and others that if we needed to save time, the thing to do was to speak only from every other page and see if anybody noticed. What I intend to do is to try and speak from every other paragraph.

These issues deal with the serious potential conflicts of interest that GPs will face in their new role as commissioners of health services. When this group of amendments first started out it contained only two amendments but it has now, quite rightly, grown substantially to address the major concerns of transparency, integrity and patient confidence and the issue of trust that must be addressed in their new role. In passing, I would say that the publication of the Government's recent draft guidance on commissioning, Developing Commissioning Support: Towards Service Excellence, in effect decrees that by 2016 the real work of CCGs will be outsourced, presumably to large private providers, which makes me start to question what is left for CCGs to worry about. However, the issue that these amendments deal with is a fundamental issue of the Bill.

We all have high regard for our GPs and we trust them as experts and advisors. We know from the evidence that they do a cost-effective and good job. Our national system of GPs may be quirky, half in and half out of the NHS, but it works. At its best, it is the very best system in the world.

We are concerned that the Bill endangers the trust that patients have for their GPs and, essentially, these amendments seek to explore and to test that. GPs are going to be decision-makers across the whole breadth of commissioning, making decisions about priorities and standards, things that may often be unpopular, and reconfigurations of service. They will handle huge amounts of money, own budgets and get bonuses for good financial performance. So patients need to be assured that they can continue to trust their GP and that their GP will always act in the patient's best interest. This concern has been flagged up by the BMA and the Royal College of General Practitioners, so I hope that the Minister can tell the House how we will be able to protect the image and reputation of our GPs after the first CCG goes wrong. Amendment 156 starts with the obvious necessary safeguard that providers of primary medical services who have a direct or indirect financial interest in the provision of services that a CCG is required to provide must not be members of the CCG. Amendment 161 is also key in requiring the Secretary of State to issue guidance which must be incorporated into CCG constitutions on how conflicts of interest must be dealt with by consortia as part of their decision-making. Transparency and clarity about how potential conflicts of interest would be managed is essential if the confidence of the public is to be maintained.

Openness and transparency are supported by Amendment 176A, requiring CCGs to maintain a publicly accessible register of all potential conflicts of interest of individuals involved in any part of their commissioning process. Taken together, Amendments 176A and 224 reinforce this, and call for regulations to stipulate that no provider should be a member of a CCG if they have any financial interest in the provision of any service the CCG is required to commission; in other words, open book accounting.

We do not think it is enough, as Amendment 228 proposes, for a CCG member merely to declare their financial interest in a commissioning decision being taken by their CCG, or absent themselves from decision making on that provider. We expect our councillors to operate under this regime. We should expect other people responsible for public money to do the same. Indeed, this transparency and openness, and the declaration of interests, should be extended to their families, in the same way that it is for other public servants.

Finally, I want to underline that we recognise that we recognise that extending GP commissioning and setting up CCGs has the potential to give GPs freedom to innovate, improve services and use commissioning to develop new models of care in the interests of the communities they serve. The safeguards against conflicts of interest proposed in these amendments are not designed to shackle CCGs. As I have said, the Department of Health commissioning guidance already does that. The safeguards will ensure that they abide by the reasonable rules, regulations and codes of practice that we would expect of any statutory body responsible for taxpayers' money worth millions of pounds.

The public needs to be assured that robust governance arrangements are in place for commissioning consortia, and that conflicts of interest will be managed effectively. I beg to move.

Photo of Baroness Williams of Crosby Baroness Williams of Crosby Liberal Democrat

My Lords, I have a great deal of sympathy with the intention behind this amendment. Noble Lords will remember that from the very beginning of the discussion about this Bill, there has been a great deal of concern about the conflict of interest that could so easily arise. Many of us recognise that the relationship between patients and general practitioners crucially depends upon that relationship being one of trust. The same will apply, if the commissioning groups work well, to the relationship between them and the patients who are within the practices of which they are part. So I sympathise very much with what the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has proposed, and also with what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has proposed in Amendment 161.

Our concerns on this side of the House are not with the whole motivation behind this. We believe that that is extremely important and we completely share it. It is our feeling, rather, that the remedies are not adequate to the scale. We feel, for example, that one of the weaknesses of both amendments is the lack of any effective sanctions against those who breach what would be a relationship of trust. At the moment there is not provision within the Bill for effective sanctions, which can be used to ensure that these high-minded and perfectly proper principles are lived by.

The Nolan principles have been very effective in local government-as we all know-and increasingly effective in national Government. There are references to those in the course of the Bill, but there is no specific determination that members of the partnership groups or the CCGs would be dealt with, if they were in breach of the requirement that they should not ever put their own interests ahead of those of their patients.

I suggest to the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Finlay, and her associates in moving these various amendments, that they would look at the amendment we have put down-and I suggest this with due humility-which effectively brings into practice powerful sanctions. We believe these will be effective in ensuring that this relationship of trust is upheld, and also that powerful requirements lie on every CCG, as well as on the board itself, that it would be absolutely clear that all interests must be declared publicly.

These will ensure that once people's names are on the register, and they have made a declaration of the appropriate kind about their own interest never being put forward as the reason for a decision, there are then effective measures that will enable the whole issue to be dealt with in detail, with appropriate requirements of sanctions and of effective punishment for those who breach them. We believe this to be absolutely central to the working of the clinical commissioning groups and to the whole relationship of doctors to their patients.

So, with those few words, I hope I can persuade the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Finlay, to have a look at the proposals that we have put forward, which, I am pleased to say, have at least to some extent the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay.

Photo of Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Crossbench

My Lords, I certainly support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, who has just spoken, and they go further than the amendments to which I have added my name. I would just draw the attention of the House to the conflicts of interest guidance from the General Medical Council, which makes it quite clear that doctors,

"must be honest in financial and commercial dealings with employers, insurers or other organisations or individuals".

It goes on to say:

"If you have a financial or commercial interest in an organisation to which you plan to refer a patient for treatment or investigation, you must tell the patient about your interest".

I would also remind the House that the ultimate sanction is to be struck off, and that if you are struck off, you lose your livelihood. I have a concern that when it comes to the implementation, warnings may actually be issued rather than stronger sanctions taken against those who might breach such guidance, because this is guidance, and it is therefore subject to interpretation.

This whole group of amendments has really gone to the heart of the problem of conflicts of interest, both for the individual general practitioner, who would be on a clinical commissioning group, but also their families and all those others around. It may be friends of theirs, who they know really well, with whom they are inclined to place some commissioning contract, or enter into some arrangement. There is a really fine line between having a personal interest, and going to that person because professionally you think that they are the best person to do the job.

Of course, I will say as a doctor, we all know the doctors that we would like to be referred to, and we all know the people who we want to work with in our teams. That is human nature. It is a mixture of competence and attitude, but there is also something about having a shared set of values, and so on, because you tend to gravitate towards people who share the same set of values as yourself. The highest principles and values would of course fall, I would hope, outside of the conflicts of interest, but financial interest is a really difficult one.

While I would suggest that none of these amendments are absolutely perfect, this group of amendments illustrates the fact that we need to come back to this at Report with a definitive amendment that really crystallises the whole problem around conflict of interest in commissioning.

Photo of Lord Greaves Lord Greaves Liberal Democrat

My Lords, I spoke on an earlier amendment this afternoon about issues that come round and round, and this one comes round across Bills. We had a great deal of quite difficult discussion on these matters in the Localism Bill-now the Localism Act-and achieved what we hoped will be a satisfactory compromise in the Bill.

It is all about standards in public life and the importance of all bodies that deal with public funds and public functions being part of the regime of standards in public life. I assume that clinical commissioning groups, while not part of local government, are certainly part of local governance, or they will be part of local governance as far as the health service is concerned. They will deal with a lot of authorities that have the standards of public life regime as part of their own practice. I wanted to go very quickly through the basic principles that need to be established in my view before this Bill is finished. First of all there have to be clear rules The Localism Act they are set out in Part 1, Chapter 7, across 11 pages and in parts of the schedules. There need to be set out on the face of the Bill so that everybody knows where we are.

There needs to be a code of conduct, whatever it is called, which is based on the Nolan principles. We came to the view in the Localism Bill, now the Act, that those principles needed to be set out again on the face of the Act: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. In my view they ought to be set out on the face of this Bill.

There needs to be a system which members of commissioning groups have to register appropriate interests and again in the Localism Act some of these were pecuniary interests, going back to the old wording which is now on the face of the new Act. There are interests other than pecuniary interests which also need to be registered even if they do not debar people from taking part in decisions. If we are going to be open about what interests people have, then they ought to be there on record. There needs to be a register of interests-there is no point in registering if there is not an open public register. Then there needs to be a system in which people taking decisions and taking part in decision-making meetings have to declare interests at the point of that decision, as in the system that we have in your Lordships' House. As the noble Baroness said, it needs to involve close families and partners as well as the individuals concerned.

Then there is no point in having that unless you have a system of dealing with complaints. It needs to be very clear what the system is, how such complaints are investigated and what penalties there are for breaching the rules. There may be different penalties for different rules. Clearly breaching the system in relation to financial pecuniary interests is much more serious than breaching one for non-pecuniary interests.

The penalties need to be clear and understood and the system for judging on them needs to be clear. The whole system has to be in the public domain. The system itself has to be open and transparent and all the actions taken under the system, whether it is just registering an interest or dealing with a complaint and the results of that complaint, have to be open, transparent and in the public domain. It seems to me that those are the principles. The details will quite rightly differ according to different organisations and different contexts. I am not suggesting the details of the local government scheme, although the amendment of my noble friend Lady Williams picks up some of the wording from the Localism Act, I think. Clearly CCGs are different from local authorities, but they are not sufficiently different that the basic principles should not apply, or the basic rules and regulations about avoiding conflicts of interest and declaring those interests when they exist and enforcing those interests within the framework of a broad code of conduct. That in my view has to apply and I hope that when the Bill leaves this House, it will incorporate sufficient detail to give those assurances.

Photo of Lord Warner Lord Warner Labour 9:00, 30 November 2011

My Lords, I just wanted to make a couple of observations and ask the Minister a question on this group of amendments. First, this is a not a new area that we are getting into. The same issues arose with GP fundholding and with practice-based commissioning. We have managed, as I recall, to sail through those two areas where we have involved GPs in the commissioning of services where there was potential for conflicts of interest without any great scandals. Has the department looked at the experience on this issue of conflicts of interest with practice-based commissioning and GP fundholding and seen whether there was a major issue? My recollection of all this from the research on GP fundholding was that there was not an issue and it was handled perfectly sensibly.

Secondly, if we actually have bigger clinical commissioning groups-and I promise the Minister I am not going to reopen the debate we have already had, no doubt to much relief in your Lordships' House-the smaller the risk, I would suggest, of conflicts of interest. There is a different set of considerations if you have got a clinical commissioning group for a population of 18,000, where inevitably there is going to be much greater potential for a conflict of interest, to one in which you are commissioning for 400,000. There is a different order of magnitude and I wonder whether that is an issue that the Government have looked at.

Thirdly, if there is concern about sanctions, the thing which really counts with doctors is the prospect of being reported to their professional bodies. It is the GMC and professional misconduct which is the big issue. We should not invent a system which is based too much on local government. It should be bedded into the professional body and the misconduct issues, because that is likely to be the way that it will have most effect with doctors involved in commissioning.

Photo of Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Liberal Democrat

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 175E, 176AA to AD, 213C and 220A, all in the names of my noble friend Lady Williams, the noble Lord, Lord Patel and myself, and in the case of 220A in the additional name of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. The purposes of these amendments are first to secure on the face of the Bill a thoroughly robust regime to avoid conflicts of interest sullying the commissioning process, and secondly to ensure transparency in the commissioning process to the greatest extent that is commercially possible. Taking the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, a moment ago, that this is not an entirely new area, I suggest that the arrangements for commissioning proposed in this Bill risk raising the threat level from conflicts of interest in the commissioning process from "moderate" to "severe", if I may use the intelligence services' scale. That is because of the greater involvement of practitioners in the commissioning process, which is of course to be welcomed for many reasons, and the increased likelihood that many practitioners may also be providers of other healthcare services or have interests in such providers.

Our task is to reduce the threat at least to "substantial", and then to manage the threat in such a way as to avoid commissioning decisions ever being skewed by the private interests of those making the decisions. Much of what we propose ought to be uncontroversial, and merely represents good practice, but we suggest, and in this I agree with my noble friend Lord Greaves, that it is important that our commitment to best practice is made clear on the face of the Bill. Amendment 220A would impose on any provider of medical services who is also a member of a CCG a duty to declare any financial interest in a commissioning decision-a bare minimum proposal, I suggest. Amendment 213C would impose on the NHS Commissioning Board a duty to refer a member of a CCG to his or her relevant professional body for material breach of the provisions or of the guidelines we propose. I entirely agree with the further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that this is an appropriate way of dealing with offending by practitioners. It should not be for the board to act as, or to set up, a disciplinary tribunal, but it is sensible and a greater deterrent, I suggest, for the professional bodies to do so.

However, the meat of our proposals is in Amendments 176AA to 176AD. We propose a thoroughly transparent regime as the best and most effective way of protecting commissioning from the insidious effects of conflicts of interest. I say insidious-and this is a point in which I pick up on what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay- because it is not only when a public decision-maker acts deliberately to favour his private personal interests that conflicts arise and threaten the system. It is also when the decision-maker at least persuades himself that his interests and the public's interests coincide. It is only public scrutiny of the process that can properly test that.

The provisions in the Bill permitting some public access to the meetings of governing bodies of commissioning groups are, I suggest, over-cautious and too limited. The system should be made more open. The public should not be excluded from governing body meetings during the all-important discussions involving a choice between potential providers. I entirely accept that that would involve a new openness about commercial transactions and decision-making. However, these decisions are about choices between providers at public expense; I question the need for meetings to be held behind closed doors in relation to them.

Secondly, in the case of other decisions where the public are excluded from governing body meetings in the public interest, then a record of decisions made should at least be published, and quickly. That is the subject of Amendment 176A.

Our amendments set out a code for dealing with conflicts of interest in new paragraphs to go into the schedule. There would be a requirement for a register of interests of all CCG members. That register should be kept up to date. It should be kept available for public inspection. Then there would be a provision to exclude from the governing body of any CCG a director of a healthcare organisation or anyone with a significant financial interest in such an organisation if there is a contract in existence between that CCG and that organisation.

Thirdly, there would be a provision to ensure that a member of such a governing body who would be excluded if such a contract came into existence would have to stand down from the governing body while any negotiations for such a contract were in progress.

Finally, our amendments import the admirable guidelines produced by the General Medical Council, entitled Good Medical Practice. Those are the guidelines to which the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, referred. I am grateful to the GMC for producing a document of such clarity and for welcoming our use of it in these amendments. The emphasis of the guidelines is on honesty and openness; that is what we are trying to achieve in this Bill. I believe it is what the Government are trying to achieve in this Bill. These are probing amendments, intended to give the Government an opportunity to consider how they might import such guidelines into the Bill at Report stage. However, our central point is this: we believe that the present provisions of the Bill do not display the seriousness, the clarity or the robustness that are required to meet the risks posed by the new arrangements. I suggest that the Bill cries out for a code in this area such as the one we have proposed.

Photo of Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Crossbench

My Lords, there is an additional area which I think means that the provisions in this Bill have to be different from other previous legislation. We face a huge financial challenge across the whole of healthcare, with budgets squeezed in a way they have not been squeezed before. So the potential for conflict of interest will go up as very difficult decisions are made. One can envisage the situation where somebody on the governing body of a clinical commissioning group will have a relative with a certain condition-and I refer back to the example I used previously, motor neurone disease. Say that person needs end-of-life care, and say that is a clinical commissioning group that has decided that it is not commissioning it in its area. There would be a direct personal conflict of interest, because that person would obviously want that care for their relative, but they would need to stand back. With the financial stringencies, the proposed amendments become even more important. While they are probing amendments, I hope the Minister in responding will recognise the importance of this area and agree to come back to it-hopefully, with a Government amendment-at a later stage.

Photo of Lord Greaves Lord Greaves Liberal Democrat

My Lords, in brief response to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, I am not suggesting in any way that the regime should be identical to the local government regime, but that the decision-making body in clinical commissioning groups will be the board. Under the new Section 14A, the board will include lay members and possibly other people. So merely relying upon professional standards and professional systems of discipline will not be sufficient.

Photo of Baroness Masham of Ilton Baroness Masham of Ilton Crossbench

My Lords, I spoke on Second Reading of the need for safeguards. These are important amendments. They are safeguards which are necessary. Many people are worried about the conflict of interest.

Photo of Earl Howe Earl Howe The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health

My Lords, I know full well that noble Lords have some concerns about the potential for conflict of interest in a system of clinical commissioning groups. Those are natural concerns, but I hope to show that the approach that we are advocating has some very specific and robust safeguards within it, which meet the intentions of the amendments in this group.

The CCG constitution provides for dealing with conflicts of interest and specifies arrangements for securing transparency about the decisions of the CCG and its governing body. The governing body must in turn ensure that the group has arrangements in place to ensure adherence to relevant principles of good governance. The CCG's governing body will have responsibility for ensuring that the CCG adheres to relevant principles of good governance. The Secretary of State can also make regulations for CCGs under Clause 71 of the Bill, which are designed to ensure that in commissioning, CCGs adhere to good procurement practice. These regulations may impose requirements relating to,

"the management of conflicts between the interests involved in commissioning services and the interests involved in providing them".

These regulations can also confer on Monitor powers to investigate suspected non-compliance. These are the safeguards that the Bill puts in place. My view is that it is unnecessary and indeed undesirable to go further.

Requiring CCGs to adhere to examples of good practice in managing conflicts of interest, such as declarations of interest; or maintaining a register of interests; or the monitoring or registration of hospitality received by members is a temptation, but one that should be resisted. We have got to be very careful about encumbering the Bill and CCGs with inflexible prescriptions as to how CCGs should operate within the statutory framework, or procedure about how they specifically manage potential conflicts of interest. This does not mean that these are not reasonable safeguards. Requiring the governing body to discuss in public choices between potential providers, or publish any decisions made in camera, for example, would remove a necessary discretion around ensuring that sensitive issues, either relating to contract values or performance, or staff matters, were given the appropriate level of confidentiality. I would urge in particular that we do not-as proposed in Amendment 175CC-put restrictions on those from whom a CCG can commission services. Given the importance we attach to ensuring that services are delivered in an integrated way, we cannot afford to cut CCGs off from being able to commission services from local GPs with a special interest, for example, who could deliver secondary care services in a community-based setting.

Photo of Baroness Thornton Baroness Thornton Shadow Spokesperson (Health), Shadow Spokesperson (Equalities and Women's Issues)

Will the noble Earl acknowledge that there is a conflict of interest there? There must be a potential conflict of interest there. How does the Bill mitigate that? How does the Bill deal with that? I cannot see from what the noble Earl has said so far that that is going to happen.

Photo of Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Crossbench 9:15, 30 November 2011

Before the Minister responds, I wonder if he could also explain why clinical commissioning groups would not necessarily have to have a register of hospitality, conflicts of interest and so on? Those of us who work for NHS trusts certainly have to complete a register, and if we receive hospitality above a minimum amount or major gifts, not only do we have to declare them, but we actually have to decline them. I think we would be subject to severe discipline if we breached that code.

Photo of Earl Howe Earl Howe The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health

I do not disagree with any of these principles, but I am not sure whether the noble Baroness understood what I said earlier: there have to be arrangements for securing transparency about the decisions of CCGs, and governing bodies have to ensure that CCGs adhere to relevant principles of good governance-think of the Nolan principles, for example, and many other ways in which good governance can take place-but there is no need to specify all this in the way these amendments suggest because the arrangements provided for in the Bill will cover these things. As the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said we are not in new territory here. There are very well established procedures for tackling conflicts of interest when they arise. There might very well be a conflict of interest in the kind of situation to which the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has alluded, but there are ways of addressing and coping with that.

The key to this is to have in place a rigorous framework of requirements, approved by the board as part of the CCG establishment process, to ensure absolute transparency and to manage conflicts of interest, subject to oversight-the oversight must be proportionate, but it has to be there. We can put on the face of the Bill, as Amendment 176AD would have us do, a detailed list of behaviours that we would expect members of CCGs to observe. Obviously I cannot disagree, as I say, with the stipulations on this list, but they are already provided for in the Nolan principles and indeed the GMC code Good Medical Practice, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, referred-and adherence to that is a condition of registration for medical professionals. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, was absolutely right: this code is what GPs and doctors in general fear to transgress. Of course, if one looks at that set of behavioural requirements, they are actually only an ideal and they have no specific system in place to ensure that they are met. The sanction on doctors is the threat that they will be referred to their regulator.

The NHS Confederation was very clear about this, and I have to say I agree with it. The Bill has to allow flexibility for the way that conflicts of interest are handled and developed over time, rather than being rigidly set in law. What the NHS Confederation told us was that conflicts of interest need to be managed effectively otherwise,

"confidence in the probity of commissioning decisions and the integrity of the clinicians involved could be seriously undermined. However, with good planning and governance, CCGs should be able to avoid these risks".

I agree with that. There is a balance to be reached, and we believe the system that the Bill would introduce for managing conflicts of interest-the key points of which I hope I have described-provides that.

Photo of Baroness Thornton Baroness Thornton Shadow Spokesperson (Health), Shadow Spokesperson (Equalities and Women's Issues)

My Lords, I thank the Minister. He will know, as will all those who have been Ministers, that when we are first appointed, we are told-the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, will remember this-that not only must we declare all our interests and have probity about the way we conduct ourselves, but we have to be seen to be doing it. A lot of these amendments are about being seen to do the right thing, and in terms of the relationship between GPs and their patients that becomes even more important. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about their amendments and the need to have proper safeguards and remedies on this.

I think that if we co-operate, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and I can probably crystallise these into something on the face of the Bill. I was disappointed that the noble Earl feels that this is satisfactory in the Bill at the moment, because I think the noise outside this Chamber and the comments from GPs tell us that people are very concerned about it. We need to address that in the Bill. I am happy to withdraw this amendment, but we may need to return to this at a later stage.

Amendment 156 withdrawn.

Amendments 157 and 158 not moved.

Amendment 159

Moved by Lord Warner

159: Clause 22, page 29, line 33, at end insert "providing that it can demonstrate that it can meet the requirements of commissioning competence specified by the Board"

Photo of Lord Warner Lord Warner Labour

In moving Amendment 159 I shall also speak to Amendments 160 and 164 in my name. I start by emphasising that this is a package of amendments that relates to many concerns that have been expressed to me and others-namely, that we need to make very sure that we ensure the assessment of competence of CCGs is sound and open before they undertake the commissioning of services that this Bill will enable them to do.

My earlier Amendment 157 enabled us to debate the number and population size of clinical commissioning groups, both of which considerations have a considerable bearing on the issue of competence of CCGs. I will not rehearse those arguments again except to emphasise that if the Government go ahead with such a large number of clinical commissioning groups, as it seems may well happen, then it is even more necessary to tighten up the Bill's provisions on proof of competence and the ability of the National Commissioning Board to reject applications where competence is in doubt. It is for those applicants to take on the role of a clinical commissioning group to prove that they are competent to take on this task and to safeguard the public money that will be entrusted to them.

Amendment 159 makes it clear that in submitting an application to the board, the clinical commissioning group applicant must demonstrate that it can meet the requirements of commissioning competence specified by the board. If its application does not do so then the board should be able to reject it out of hand. The onus is on that group to show that it is competent to undertake the commissioning. It seems to me that clinical commissioning groups will have had plenty of time to assemble their case and to prepare for their application. The Bill should make it absolutely clear that a demonstration of competence should be mandatory in submitting an application. If I can put it crudely, we do not want to see people taking a punt. They have to be able to demonstrate that they can actually do the job, otherwise public money and safety will be put at risk.

Amendment 160 is linked to Amendment 159. It requires that when the board publishes information for applicants, that information document must specify the competencies required to commission health services. This problem of specifying competencies in commissioning has bedevilled the whole movement towards commissioning over several decades. Mark Britnell's attempts at world-class commissioning ran into the same problem-we were not sufficiently clear about what competencies would deliver good quality health services from commissioners. So this competency issue is at the heart of making clinical commissioning groups work. It is vital that the board is left in no doubt of its responsibility for doing this and that applicants are in no doubt that the competency hurdle that they have to clear is put very clearly to them before their application can be accepted. What we do not want to see, if I may put it this way, is a load well meaning waffle coming out of the board about commissioning. We want to have articulated the competencies that have to be met before applicants can be successful. Amendment 164 rounds the whole process off in terms of applicants showing that they can discharge clinical commissioning group functions "competently", which is the word which it adds to the Bill.

These amendments make it clear that Parliament regards competence in commissioning as the yardstick by which the success or failure of applications to become clinical commissioning groups will be judged. This issue should be uppermost in the mind of the board when it makes decisions, and wording that makes this clear should be on the face of the Bill. Competence in commissioning has been missing in the past and we are in danger of repeating the mistakes of the past by not making it absolutely clear in this Bill what is required of the applicants to be clinical commissioning groups. I beg to move.

Photo of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Shadow Deputy Leader of the House of Lords, Shadow Spokesperson (Cabinet Office)

My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group. I will start with Amendment 159A which questions why, on page 9, line 36, it is possible for non-providers of primary medical services to be eligible to apply to establish a clinical commissioning group. Particularly in the light of my noble friend's comments on Amendment 159, one would surely only want applicants who had experience of providing GP services to be able to apply to form a clinical commissioning group.

Amendment 160A requires the board, before considering an application to form a clinical commissioning group, to consult with the general public, the relevant local authority, the relevant health and wellbeing board, and patients receiving primary medical services from providers within the clinical commissioning group. The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, raised some pertinent questions about transparency in the formation of clinical commissioning groups. It is extraordinary that there seems to be no process by which putative CCGs consult with their patients before they make an application. The decision is, essentially, being made by bureaucrats within the National Health Service system-who put constraints on CCGs,-and the GPs themselves. Where on earth are the public in all of this?

Photo of Lord Greaves Lord Greaves Liberal Democrat

The noble Lord very kindly referred to what I said. Is it not also the case that a group of GPs could go ahead and put forward proposals without even consulting all the GPs in their area?

Photo of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Shadow Deputy Leader of the House of Lords, Shadow Spokesperson (Cabinet Office)

From the reading the Bill, it is only when two or more are gathered together that they can make such an application. So the noble Lord is quite right. The amendment is seeking assurance that there will be public consultation and consultation with patients. We are told this is all about patients. Can patients therefore be consulted before GPs commit themselves to forming a clinical commissioning group? Or are we just to be told at some stage, "That's it, you are in that clinical commissioning group because you are in that practice and you have no choice". It is remarkably high-handed for it all to be done with no public involvement whatever. It is remarkable how many changes are already being made without any statutory authority given by this legislation.

I want to continue the theme of consultation, because I have a number of amendments in this group which come back to the same point: Amendment 164A in relation to the board's determination of applications; Amendment 166 in relation to variations in the constitution of clinical commissioning groups; Amendment 166B in respect of variations made in the area covered by a clinical commissioning group, as specified in the constitution; Amendment 167A in respect of mergers, and Amendment 167B as regards the dissolution of clinical commissioning groups.

If I as a patient am part of the clinical commissioning group, one would have thought that I would have a role in deciding whether it is appropriate for that clinical commissioning group to be dissolved, or is that again just for the GPs to decide? What about Amendment 216ZZA as regards commissioning plans? Perhaps I have misread the Bill and there are crucial points which would envisage members of the public and patients within a CCG area being consulted on all these matters.

On the question of parliamentary scrutiny, many of the rules concerning the application to become a clinical commissioning group are to be covered by regulations. I would have thought that, in view of their importance, these ought to be affirmative. Amendments 164B, 166A, 166C and 167C provide for that.

Over and above matters to do with application of parliamentary scrutiny are questions as to what CCGs are actually going to do and how we can ensure that they understand that their responsibility is to provide comprehensive provision to their patients covered by clinical commissioning groups. My Amendment 163 seeks to cover that. Under proposed new Section 14C to be inserted in the 2006 Act, the board must grant an application if it is satisfied as to a series of matters set out in proposed new Section 14C(2). In proposed new Section 14C(2)(e), the board has to be satisfied that a CCG is able to discharge its functions. What functions are these? This takes us back to Clause 10, whose functions on CCGs are dissipated from the functions set out in Section 3 of the NHS Act 2006, which encompass comprehensive revision.

This is vitally important. What are we entitled to as patients from our local clinical commissioning group? This is very important when it comes to any potential rationing by those CCGs in terms of treatments that we can receive. I, for one, prefer the safeguard that is contained in Section 3 of the 2006 Act, unamended, as opposed to the proposals in this Bill.

Amendment 166ZA is concerned with applications to vary the constitution of a clinical commissioning group and asks for the board to determine and publish, after consultation, criteria which Government are granting as a variation to the constitution. It is not unreasonable for us to know under what criteria such a variation may be granted.

My Amendment 167BA makes the same point in respect of the dissolution of a clinical commissioning group. My Amendment 220ZC will also provide for patients covered by a clinical commissioning group to be consulted in any proposed dissolution. Amendment 167D relates to property transfers in the event of a dissolution or variation of the constitution of a CCG and again requires the board to consult before a property transfer can take place. Finally, my Amendment 165 provides that when a clinical commissioning group is granted an application, it is wholly committed to assume the duties under Section 3 of the NHS Act 2006.

Photo of Baroness Williams of Crosby Baroness Williams of Crosby Liberal Democrat 9:30, 30 November 2011

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, particularly on Amendment 160A. The idea that patients whose GPs are serving on the Commissioning Board, or are part of a commissioning group which represents that board, should be consulted and we should hear what their own experiences have been, is innovative and interesting. He should be congratulated on putting it forward. It means involving patients as individuals in their own assessment of the service that they have had. Time and again the Bill reflects the demand that that should happen-no decision without me, and so on. This actually makes that real. It gives the words flesh, and I congratulate him on that. It is quite an exciting idea and I hope that it is one that will commend itself to the Government, given the Government's wish to involve patients.

I am not so happy about Amendment 163B. I fear that the opposition Front Bench has not taken on board as much as I hoped that it might the idea that regulations should not go straight to Parliament, even if they are affirmative, but should go by way of the Health Select Committee. The noble Lord will be familiar with the argument-that the Health Select Committee has a huge range of expertise and knowledge. As a former Minister he will know-as well as I or the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, knows-that the regime of regulatory scrutiny is not very effective. If there is an individual Member of Parliament in another place who knows a great deal about it and is concerned about it, you can have a real debate and that real debate can affect the outcome with regard to regulation. However, nine times out of 10, there is no great debate. In the case of the negative resolution procedure, there is often no debate at all.

I fear that this is a very weak safeguard for the huge amount of regulation that is built into the Bill. I therefore hope that I might commend to the House, and not least to the opposition Front Bench, the idea of looking again at the proposal, which is also radical and new. It is an idea that really ought to commend itself to those of us who believe strongly in accountability to Parliament and in the need to strengthen Parliament's power vis-à-vis the Executive across the whole world.

Photo of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Shadow Deputy Leader of the House of Lords, Shadow Spokesperson (Cabinet Office)

My Lords, perhaps I can come back to that. On Amendment 160A, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her support. I am not even sure that I got it right. I am also trying to get at the fact that so much is happening now without any consultation. The CCGs are essentially being decided by the system and then at some stage there will be a formal application process. I am long enough in the tooth in the health service to know about NHS consultation. Frankly, we all know that the traditional NHS consultations make the decision and then consult. I fear that, with CCGs, this is what is happening. While I welcome the support for the involvement of the public in a formal application, I find it perplexing that so much is now being decided and that the public are not involved at all.

I listened to the noble Earl before supper talking about this being bottom up. That is not what is happening. I do not think that he understands quite how much this is being driven by the centre. It is quite extraordinary. You can call it guidance, but putative CCGs are being given such clear steers about what will be acceptable. I feel that we will reach a situation where, at some point, it will all be a done deal and the consultation will simply not be realistic.

On the noble Baroness's comments about making the regulations affirmative, I accept that, even if they are affirmative, there is a limit to what parliamentary scrutiny can provide-although that does provide some safeguards. I would be interested in debating the idea of giving the Health Select Committee a role, although excluding your Lordships' House from it would be a problem. I say to the noble Baroness that I think it a pity that the House did not adopt my suggestion about a mandate for a kind of national policy statement approach. There is an argument for having a more interactive debate, if you like, about some of these matters. I very much take to heart her constructive comments on this and the Select Committee role. It could be a very useful debate for the future.

Photo of Lord Alderdice Lord Alderdice Liberal Democrat

My Lords, lest it be thought that we were all wholly of one mind on these Benches in regard to some of these proposals, let me say that I am much more cautious about the propositions. My noble friend Lady Williams of Crosby has described the propositions for consultation with patients as novel. She is quite right. When the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, says that he recognises NHS consultations from the past as decisions first and consultation afterwards, he recognises how the previous Government carried out their business. As somebody who was in the health service at the time, I was very familiar with it.

We must be realistic about some of the propositions that come forward for consultation. Think through what is actually involved in doctors coming forward with proposals to fulfil the requirements set down in legislation in all its various aspects passed by Parliament, and then being asked to consult with the patients as to what exactly they think. Think through what exactly that might look like for general practitioners and their patients-those patients who would choose to back the general practitioner in his application to go along with the proposals, or would start to run a campaign against their GP. Is there really a thought that this will be something that serves the interests of helping general practitioners and their patients to move forward together? It is an interesting and novel proposal from the point of view of debate in your Lordships' House. However, I am not at all convinced that it has been thought through in terms of how one might actually implement such a thing, and in terms of working with patients and patients working with their general practitioners.

In psychiatry, for example, I think of how much discussion and consultation there has been with patients about who their sector psychiatrist might be, never mind all sorts of other important decisions about them. The fact is that it is not a way in which one can possibly run these things. It is important to have consultation with the public in general, but to try to divide it up so that patients are consulted on whether their GP should follow decisions taken in line with decisions that Parliament set down is wholly another matter. My noble friend was right to describe it as "novel", but I am much more cautious about the proposal than she is.

Photo of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Shadow Deputy Leader of the House of Lords, Shadow Spokesperson (Cabinet Office)

I thought that what the noble Lord said about the last Government was a cheap shot. I was talking about the NHS consultation in my experience over 40 years. It has not been a wholly satisfactory situation. It is quite remarkable what the noble Lord seems to be saying. The health service has strong corporate governance and strong processes for consultation, but suddenly we are bunging £80 million to GPs and they do not have to consult. Are they in such a mystical position that they do not need strong corporate governance; that we can trust them, even though some of that money will be spent with the GPs instead of on other parts of the health service? Suddenly we think that they are jolly good chaps and we can trust them. We can trust them simply to form these clinical commissioning groups, in which in theory they will have great power, and there is no consultation whatever. It is quite remarkable what the noble Lord is saying.

Photo of Lord Alderdice Lord Alderdice Liberal Democrat

My Lords, let us be clear. It was no cheap shot. It was a comment on how the previous Government carried through their policies. He will know very well that I sat on those Benches and asked the questions of him. I am very much aware of it. What I said had nothing to do with corporate governance. It was the specific proposal that GPs' patients should be asked to express a view on the proposition that their general practitioner be part of a clinical commissioning group. As though there was some serious alternative to it, and that it was something that could be carried through willy-nilly without any potential disadvantage in the GPs' conduct of the practice.

What I pointed out was that this is not something that has any kind of precedent; it was, as my noble friend said, "novel". What I said about it was quite clear. It has not been tried and I am not persuaded that it is something that has been well thought through. It could be very divisive within a practice. That is not at all to say that other elements of corporate governance are not appropriate. I wholly support them and the proposal. I was addressing a specific issue and I notice that it was the one issue that the noble Lord did not respond to.

Photo of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Shadow Deputy Leader of the House of Lords, Shadow Spokesperson (Cabinet Office)

So I as a patient have no right to say or comment on which clinical commissioning group my GP wants to join? It is nothing to do with me and just up to the GPs to decide? That is what he said. On the question of general consultation, let me remind him of the NHS plan. If this Government had done this properly, they would have published a Green Paper. They would have gone through a process of working with the health service, they might have spent six to nine months doing it and they would have got much greater by it. It shows that they have dealt with these reforms in a high-handed manner. The result is that there is no buy-in whatever and that is why the Government are in the trouble they are. I pray in aid the way that the NHS plan was dealt with and the fact that 500 people came together on a number of bases to work on the plan. That is why it had so much greater ownership.

Photo of Lord Alderdice Lord Alderdice Liberal Democrat 9:45, 30 November 2011

My Lords, I addressed one specific proposal, not the whole world and the whole conduct of the Bill. I addressed one specific proposal, and the noble Lord comes back and tells me, "Has a patient no right to express a view?". Of course the patient has a right to express a view. There will be public consultation. That is not the issue. The issue is that the noble Lord produced a specific proposal. One of my colleagues found it novel and interesting. I find it novel, but I am not at all persuaded that it has been well thought through, and I am interested that the noble Lord jumped so immediately to defend not the proposal but his posture.

Photo of Lord Patel Lord Patel Crossbench

My Lords, I thought that I might get up to say one sentence to stop this conversation from going further. My name is on several amendments, particularly those proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, about competency. I have a simple question, which I am sure the Minister will be able to answer easily. What competencies do the commissioners have to demonstrate before they are authorised to become commissioners? I know that there will be guidance, but what competencies will be looked at that demonstrate that they can be commissioners? I am being very brief today because of being chastised for talking too long; but now I have evidence that suggests that I was not the worst, so I will carry on another time.

Photo of Lord Greaves Lord Greaves Liberal Democrat

My Lords, I want to say one or two things about the consultation and go back to what I was saying before dinner. The question of patients is a bit of a red herring. To that extent, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, was asking to be tripped up over it. Everybody is a patient to some extent, but the important thing is that the residents of an area, or citizens-whatever they are called nowadays-should know what is going on and that there should be an opportunity for a public debate to take place in the normal places-local newspapers, local radio, public meetings-about the future, structure and organisation of the health services in their area.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, was absolutely right when he said that there is a huge amount going on at the moment. It is not going on in complete secrecy; people involved in it know what is happening and are telling other people, and people in local authorities and others are having some discussions. However, by and large, there is not a proper process for providing people with open and full-or even partial-information about the proposals that are taking place. I do not think that it is a question of patients being able to tell their doctors which CCG they want to be part of, because the CCGs will be area-based, as we all know, and the doctors will be part of the CCG in their area. The questions are: what area is that going to cover, where is the CCG going to be, and how is it going to fit in to the health service? That is a fundamental question. So to that extent the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is absolutely right. I think that the question of patients is a red herring.

Whenever I go to see my doctor, I consult him about what is happening in the health service, he consults me about that and all sorts of other things, and occasionally we get around to talking about my health; but I do not suppose that I am a very typical patient. That is a fact of life. However, it is a fundamental problem, and the source of a huge amount of the mistrust about what is going on at the moment is that people simply cannot find out what is going on. That is not in the amendments to this Bill. The Minister and his colleagues simply need to tell the health service to be a lot more open and transparent about what is going on and allow local debate on it.

Photo of Earl Howe Earl Howe The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health

My Lords, these amendments are all concerned with the process of the establishment of CCGs or changes to the established organisation. The Bill lays the groundwork for the NHS Commissioning Board to establish CCGs. Ensuring the competence of an applicant group to exercise the functions of a CCG is a key part of that process.

In the first instance, the board may publish guidance on the making of applications and this may include details of how it will assess the fitness of CCGs for establishment and therefore their suitability to assume responsibility for exercising their commissioning functions. That is really what Amendment 159 is trying to get at. The whole process is intended to ensure that the CCG has made appropriate arrangements to discharge its functions competently. If the board is not satisfied about that, it will not grant the CCG's application, or else it will grant it subject to conditions under the transitional arrangements.

I can confirm that we intend to make provision in regulations to require the NHS Commissioning Board to take the views of the shadow health and well-being board into account when they consider the establishment of a CCG. Health and well-being boards will be able to provide insight into the willingness and ability of a prospective CCG to be involved in partnership working and engaging with the local population. That is the theme of Amendments 160A and 162.

However, in my view, wider mandatory consultation with the public, either by a prospective CCG or by the board on receipt of an application to be established, would be completely disproportionate and add unwarranted delay to the establishment of new arrangements. We already have intelligence that early implementer health and well-being boards are engaging in constructive dialogue with CCG pathfinders about the right size, area and configuration to best meet local patient needs. That is fine, but problems arise when you start to mandate it. I am very uncomfortable about that. Consultation with the public has its rightful place but I was completely unconvinced by the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. For my money he simply has not made the case.

We also need to ensure that we do not have a cumbersome process for agreeing changes to CCGs, which may evolve over time as organisations and may choose to merge formally or to adapt their constitutions, which of course would need to be agreed with the board. A number of amendments in this group seek to require consultation, with the public, the relevant local authority, the relevant health and well-being board and patients receiving primary medical services from providers within the CCG, for different processes: establishment, variation, merger or dissolution of CCGs. The Bill as it stands would set clear duties for patient and public engagement in new Section 14Z. CCGs would have to engage the public in their planning of the commissioning arrangements; in the development and consideration of commissioning proposals, which would have an impact on the manner in which the services are delivered to the individuals; and in the range of health services available. They would also have to engage on decisions of the CCG affecting the operation of the commissioning arrangements where implementation of the arrangements would impact on individuals or the range of services available. The CCG would also have to consult the patients it is responsible for on its commissioning plan. That is quite right and proper and I hope that, in that area at least, there will be some agreement across the House.

As regards local authorities and health and well-being boards, these boards will include representation from the local authority and CCGs. I suggest that is the ideal forum for CCGs to discuss proposals such as mergers with their fellow members. However, it would not be appropriate to impose an explicit requirement for CCGs to consult the board on such matters.

Turning to Amendments 164B, 166A, 166C and 167C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, I commend the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships' House. These amendments would make the resolution procedure for certain regulation-making powers relating to applications between CCGs and the board affirmative. This approach was rejected by the DPRRC, which found that the negative resolution procedure would give noble Lords ample opportunity to consider regulations laid before the House covering determination of applications for establishment of a CCG, for variation of CCG constitutions and on dissolution of CCGs.

The noble Lord, Lord Patel, asked me about competencies. In September the department published Developing Clinical Commissioning Groups:Towards Authorisation, which sets out our current thinking on the domains that the Commissioning Board may wish to use as indicators to judge the competencies of prospective CCG commissions.

While I know that there will not be a meeting of minds over this, I hope that I have at least fleshed out what the Government's intentions are. There will, obviously, be opportunity for further reflection on these matters.

Photo of Lord Warner Lord Warner Labour

My Lords, I was not convinced by the noble Earl's views on the number of clinical commissioning groups in our earlier debate. I was even less convinced by what he had to say about competencies. There was a lot of talk about, "The board may wish to do this", and, "The board may wish to do that", on competencies. The problem of healthcare commissioning in this country has actually been the lack of competency. That has been the problem for 10 to 20 years, under successive Governments. If we miss the boat again on this issue, we are making a great blunder.

I do not want to go over the ground about consultation with the public at all. I am interested in having in the Bill that the critical requirement of becoming a clinical commissioning group is competency to do the job, and that the board is required to specify what those competencies are, before people make an application. My noble friend Lord Hunt has made the perfectly sensible observation that while we are sitting, chatting about this Bill, people out there are doing the business about who will be clinical commissioning groups. That is what is actually happening. We need to make sure that they are under no illusions that competency is the yardstick by which they will be judged. I am not satisfied with the Government's response and wish to test the opinion of the House.

Division on Amendment 159

Contents 46; Not-Contents 106.

Amendment 159 disagreed.

Division number 1 Health and Social Care Bill — Committee (9th Day) (Continued)

Aye: 44 Members of the House of Lords

No: 104 Members of the House of Lords

No: A-Z by last name

Tellers

[For the continuation of today's proceedings, see Official Report, 1 December 2011.]