My Lords, your Lordships will have noticed that the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, was due to reply to this short debate, but since she has been called to higher things, I am very pleased that her place has been taken by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath.
It is not my purpose to go over old ground tonight. In the short time available I shall concentrate on one single issue. For better or worse, Parliament has decided that we should have a Supreme Court. I accept that decision although I did not, and do not, agree with it. Parliament has also decided that the present Law Lords, who will be the first members of the Supreme Court, should no longer be entitled to take part in legislative business of this House. I accept that decision too, although again I do not agree with it. What I do not accept, and what I ask the House to consider tonight, is whether in order to achieve those two ends, whether laudable or not, it is necessary to move the new Supreme Court into the Middlesex Guildhall. That is the question I raise.
The principal reason for doing so is that it would symbolise,
"the separation of powers between the judiciary and legislature".—[Hansard, 14/6/07; col. WS 125.]
That is a direct quotation from the most recent Written Statement dated
I come now to what it will all cost. We did not have the full costs when we debated these matters in 2005, but now that the contract has been let we are told that the total cost of setting up the Supreme Court in the Guildhall will be £57 million. However, the Ministry of Justice does not have £57 million to hand, so most of that cost will be met on what I might call the "never never" system. Thus the contractor's costs of £36 million will be met by leasing the Guildhall to the contractor and then entering into a sub-lease under which the Ministry of Justice will pay rent of £2.1 million a year for 30 years, increasing at a rate of 2.5 per cent per annum.
That may seem an odd set-up for our prestigious new Supreme Court, but there it is. However, it is not the end of it. The great bulk of the £2.1 million which will be required annually will be met not out of the existing resources of the Ministry of Justice but by increasing the fees payable by civil litigants in the lower courts. That cannot be right. Why should litigants in the lower courts pay for the new Supreme Court? Of what conceivable interest is it to them?
Looking at costs the other way round, the cost of servicing the Law Lords where they are at present is very modest indeed. The additional cost of moving them to the Guildhall was estimated in 2004 at £5.2 million a year. It is now estimated at £9.7 million a year—nearly double, and far in excess of the current cost.
So far I have mentioned only the cost of setting up the Supreme Court in the Guildhall, but there is also the cost of creating seven new courtrooms to replace those which were used daily in the Guildhall until March this year. The plan was to create seven new courtrooms somewhere in the centre of London. That is where they are needed, especially since Knightsbridge Crown Court no longer exists. As I understood it, that was the plan in 2005, but it is now proposed to build five new courts at Isleworth—six new courts less one old court which has to be demolished—at a cost of £18.2 million. However, Isleworth is nowhere near the centre of London and is not where new courts are needed. The total cost of this whole unnecessary operation will be £75 million—£57 million plus £18 million—and all to symbolise, as we have been told, the physical separation of the Supreme Court from the legislature. I emphasise the word "symbolise".
These are very large sums of money, and no doubt they will be a great deal larger by the time the final bill is paid, for any good that will ensue. However, they must also be looked at in the context of the economies that are currently being forced on the Courts Service—economies which I believe are unprecedented. On the previous occasion that we discussed these matters, the noble Viscount, Lord Bledisloe, mentioned that magistrates face cuts of 3.5 per cent in each of the next three years. However, that is only the tip of the iceberg. The Courts Service as a whole has suffered a cutback of 5.4 or 5.6 per cent in the current year. No doubt that cut will be even greater next year when the Ministry of Justice has to find money for prisons as well as funding the black hole in legal aid.
In the face of these severe and painful cutbacks, what must ordinary people who work in the Courts Service think when they read that £75 million is being spent on moving the Law Lords to the Guildhall, where, incidentally, they will perform exactly the same function as they do in the Palace of Westminster? They will surely regard it as a complete waste of public money which could be much better spent elsewhere. What is to be done? As we all know, the Ministry of Justice is under new management. I hope that it will be less concerned with symbolism and more concerned with value for money.
The Government could have the Supreme Court they want, exactly as they want it, tomorrow if only they would abandon the idea of moving it to the Guildhall. It would require only a very simple amendment to Section 148 of the Constitutional Reform Act, and Part 3 creating the Supreme Court could be brought into force now instead of having to wait until October 2009. Surely that would be symbolism enough. It is not too late for the Ministry of Justice to take that course and I urge it to do so. If we are serious about value for money, it is the only sensible course. Then, when the necessary refurbishment of the Guildhall is complete, at comparatively little cost, the Crown Courts could return to the Guildhall where they belong and the Law Lords could remain as the new Supreme Court where they are—here in the Palace of Westminster.
My Lords, I am delighted to have the opportunity to follow the noble and learned Lord's presentation of this case and to make the point that, quite apart from the extravagance involved, which he described so well, the more one looks at it, the more one realises that the theoretical purpose underlying this change has no foundation whatever and that the consequences of it will be damaging to the independence of the Supreme Court, when the opposite was the objective of the exercise.
The concept of the separation of powers, from which all this started, does not recognise that the real power which needs to be separated from the others is that of the Executive. For the most part the judiciary and the legislature work in a close partnership. The legislature is, of course, acknowledged to have the supremacy—the judiciary acknowledges that—but the judiciary has its own independence. As I say, they work in partnership. The trouble comes when the Executive's influence is extended in either direction.
For example, one thinks about the change in the method of appointing judges to the High Court. Although it embraces one solid and sensible thing; namely, the establishment of an Appointments Commission and machinery of that kind, the ultimate political authority over it—there has to be some; it is there in the statute—has passed from the Lord Chancellor, whom we now see is becoming symbolic in name rather like the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, to a non-lawyer outside this House. That, if anything, diminishes the fraternity between the head of the judicial system, supervising the old system of appointment, and replaces it by a politically accountable authority. There is no sense in that. It is not only in that respect that the change is being made. If one looks at the financing as well, that has much the same effect.
I digress for a second because I detect a similar lack of respect for the values of integrity and independence in the decisions being taken about the Attorney-General. The decision that the Attorney-General is no longer to determine whether prosecutions should be brought puts that in the hands of a perfectly respectable but non-accountable official within the Civil Service system—or several of them. The Attorney-General is no longer a Member of the Commons and no longer going to accept this responsibility, and moreover, if symbolism is relevant, in the days long ago when I was a law officer myself, the Law Officers Department, although small in numbers, was a department lodged in the Royal Courts of Justice, manifestly linked to the judicial arm of the constitution. Now its name has changed—it is now the Attorney-General's Office. It sits alongside Scotland Yard. All the efforts made in other jurisdictions to separate the police court from the police station are being taken in the wrong direction by the transformation of the Law Officers Department—a body with some sounding authority—into the Attorney-General's Office next to Scotland Yard. It is a symbol of the way in which these things are being allowed to go in the wrong direction.
As the noble and learned Lord has pointed out, the expense is enormous and is already ravaging the budgets of the court system and doing nothing to improve the performance of the Supreme Court. If one looks at the way in which our present Supreme Court is financed, so far as I can discover its total budget, apart from the judicial salaries, administered as it is by this House, is about £200,000. It has been administered well, within that framework, for a very long time. Moreover, Resource Accounts for 2005-06 says:
I know that for myself because, when I first went to the Treasury, I tried to impose cash limits on this House and was rebuffed by the noble Lord, Lord Barnett. Then when I was wearing the other hat, as Leader of the House, I was able to rebuff a similar onslaught by the then Chancellor, Sir John Major as he now is.
We have sacrificed independence of the Executive, both in financing and in the overall appointment of members of the Supreme Court, when we need have done none of those things and could well have remained—even under the legislation—as the noble and learned Lord has said, with the Supreme Court still functioning in this building with a separate, independent entrance. It is a case that I argued when we were looking at the so-called Constitutional Reform Bill. Why not have a separate entrance with as much aggrandisement as you like? You could have a very splendid special entrance for a good deal less than £50 million and the Supreme Court would remain functioning, manifestly and symbolically independent of this House. That would do at least something to mitigate the damage in the substance of the relationship, which I have tried to describe.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, has returned us to an important issue. As I expected, his purpose is not just to get the information requested by his Question, which could have been obtained by tabling a Question for Written Answer, but to suggest that the Supreme Court should remain in the Palace of Westminster. I thought he might go further and suggest that the Supreme Court should not be brought into existence at all, but he has gone only half way there.
The noble and learned Lord and I have been involved in many debates in your Lordships' House. He and I, on many of these issues—for example, terrorism—are comrades in arms. On others, and I am afraid this is one, we find ourselves as opponents.
I have always thought that it was absurd that the highest court in the land was technically a committee of your Lordships' House. That issue is not being raised again today, though perhaps we have come close to it. But the noble and learned Lord says that he accepts that decision. To keep the Supreme Court in the Palace of Westminster would be an entirely unsatisfactory halfway house. So long as the Supreme Court is perching in the Palace of Westminster, it will be seen as part of your Lordships' House. It will still use perhaps a Committee Room, perhaps the Lord Chancellor's old Room—certainly something that is a traditional part of the Palace of Westminster—for its hearings.
It will still have offices in the Palace of Westminster, or in one of the adjoining buildings in Millbank or elsewhere that belong to the House of Lords. It will still, in that capacity, be seen as an offshoot of your Lordships' House. But future justices of the Supreme Court, under the Constitutional Reform Act, will not be Members of your Lordships' House. They will not have a right to sit in this Chamber or to speak here, though no doubt they will have the right to use the refreshment facilities. They will in effect be strangers in their own building, and I do not believe you can have a Supreme Court with the proper authority that it should have if it has no building of its own, no courtrooms and no proper facilities for the judges.
Let me look briefly at the question of the conversion of the Middlesex Guildhall. The location is ideal—it is in the heart of the historic centre of government. The building is not ideal—I am not an admirer of it as a piece of architecture. Its neo-Gothic style was already out of date when it was built in 1911. It was built for a local authority, Middlesex County Council. Only later did it become a court, so already it has had one fundamental change of use. The internal fittings, while interesting, are not of great merit. But I think it is capable of conversion into something that would be a more than adequate home for the Supreme Court.
It is certainly much better than what the Law Lords have now. The Committee Room, as a court, has very little space for observers or indeed for lawyers. The Law Lords themselves have tiny rooms on the second floor. The refurbishment of the Middlesex Guildhall and providing accommodation for the courts displaced by its transfer to the Supreme Court will indeed cost money—quite substantial money. But is this country so poor that we cannot provide proper accommodation for our Supreme Court? Surely we do not want a Supreme Court stuck in an archaic rut in the Palace of Westminster. The Supreme Court needs to be a proper Supreme Court, with its own building, not an adjunct of your Lordships' House, and of course the Supreme Court needs to be properly housed and with the proper facilities, which I believe it will get in the Middlesex Guildhall.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for raising this Question. I wish to raise two concerns relating to the relationship of the courts to the citizen, and the relationship of the courts to the Executive.
When the Constitutional Reform Bill was going through your Lordships' House, the Government justified the need for a new Supreme Court on the grounds that the citizen could not distinguish between the House of Lords in its judicial capacity and the House of Lords in its legislative capacity. The justification was to do with perception, not with the delivery of justice. However, when I asked for empirical evidence to support the Government's claim, none was forthcoming. As I argued at the time, we thus proceeded on the Government's perception of the views of the ordinary citizen—in other words, the perception of a perception.
Given the extent to which the Government are prepared to rely on popular perception, perhaps the Minister could tell us what he thinks popular perception will be of the cost of the delivery of justice once the new building is complete. I refer not only to the £57 million set-up costs but also to the running costs. Can he confirm the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, that the running costs will be met from fees paid by litigants? I am not so much concerned with the actual amounts involved, but simply with the principle and how this will be viewed by the public.
I turn to the relationship between the courts and the Executive. Moving the Law Lords across Parliament Square may be a relatively easy move in a physical sense but it is a potentially damaging one politically. Recent years have seen a notable clash between the Executive and the courts. Successive Home Secretaries have attacked court judgements. Following the Belmarsh case, Jack Straw claimed that the Law Lords were "simply wrong" to imply that detainees were being held arbitrarily. Even Prime Minister Tony Blair involved himself, declaring in August 2005 that,
"the rules of the game are changing".
The extent of Ministers' attacks led the Lord Chief Justice to defend the judges, stressing that they were doing their job of applying the law and enforcing the rule of law. As he told the Constitution Committee of this House,
"it is the law that has changed".
The relationship between the Executive and the courts has become increasingly strained. My fear is that moving the Law Lords out of the Palace of Westminster will leave them much more isolated. Having them within this House provides some degree of protection. Members of your Lordships' House have some appreciation of the role and significance of the Appellate Committee. The Law Lords gain some understanding of the parliamentary process, which is important in allowing some margin of appreciation for that process. Being within your Lordships' House provides something of a protective shield against the Executive. Once the Law Lords move across Parliament Square, they become isolated. Over time, this House will have less awareness of who they are and what they do. They will potentially be out on a much greater limb politically than is presently the case. Given the tensions between the Executive and the judiciary, this is arguably the worst time to be making such a move.
And why make such a move? It is, as I say, because of perceptions. If everything is in the name, why not, as the noble and learned Lord said, confine the change to one of name alone? Why does the Supreme Court have to exist outside the Palace of Westminster? I note, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, that we would not be the first western country in history to have a supreme court sitting in the same building as the legislature. Leaving the Law Lords where they are, but changing the name of the court, would deal with the problems of perception, cost and political isolation. Given that, would there not be a case for leaving the Middlesex Guildhall as it is and leaving the Law Lords where they are?
My Lords, I thought it appropriate that one of those who is to work in the building that we are discussing should contribute to this debate. My qualification for doing so is that for the past three years I have been chairman of a Law Lords' sub-committee, of which the other members are my noble and learned friends Lady Hale of Richmond and Lord Mance. We have been working with civil servants on the implementation programme team on the plans for the building and on a large variety of other matters that need to be attended to in connection with the creation of the new court.
As I am sure your Lordships will appreciate, this is a very detailed and time-consuming exercise. We have monthly committee meetings with the programme team. Each of us, as well as a number of other Law Lords, has individual tasks which are required to be dealt with separately. I pay tribute to the contributions that all my colleagues are making to this work and especially to the Principal Clerk in the Judicial Office, who bears an even greater burden and contributes many hours of his own time to the enterprise.
We are, of course, wholly committed to the project which has been set before us. Our main aim in the short term is to achieve a transfer of the business of the House's Appellate Committee to the new court as seamlessly as possible. But we are determined also to ensure that the new court will be accommodated and resourced in a manner that fits its status as the country's Supreme Court.
In welcoming the Minister to his new responsibilities, I confess that I feel a bit like a baby who, having been abandoned in his pram by one parent, has found another. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, whose project this truly was, after all, has left us. He was deeply interested in its success and his door was always open when there were problems that needed to be discussed at his level—as indeed there were from time to time. I hope that this will continue to be the case with the Minister and the Lord Chancellor in another place. The project is not without its problems. We need your help and your support.
There are three problems in particular that I should mention. The first relates to timetable. The plan is that the Supreme Court should commence its operations on
The second point relates to staff; it is the other side of the coin referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. The key to a seamless and successful transfer lies in our staff's experience and in their commitment and loyalty to the project. But the implications for them of transferring to the Civil Service from employment here in the Palace of Westminster are very serious. That subject has not been addressed in this House so far as I can recall. The new court will be a tiny enterprise in the context of the Ministry of Justice as a whole, and unless some weighting is given in recognition of the court's importance in matters such as grading, this will have adverse consequences. The grading which our staff will receive under current Civil Service rules is well below the equivalent in this building. This means a standstill on salary increases for several years for those who choose to move. The conditions of service, too, are much less attractive. I am not convinced that enough has been done to address this problem. We may need some political muscle to address it.
The third matter relates to finance, the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon. The funding arrangements for the new court are novel and complex and, in important respects, are still unknown. There is no doubt that the court's removal from the protective umbrella of Parliament will expose it to the risk of undue pressure on its funding, and on its resources generally, by the Executive. The Executive will have to bear part—perhaps a substantial part—of the running costs, due to the nature of the business that we conduct. This is not a criticism of the present Government, but we cannot predict the future. Safeguards absent from the Act must be put in place. Progress cannot be made until the identities are known of the first President of the Court and of the chief executive. I hope that the Minister can give us his assurance that this vital matter will receive his attention, and that of the Lord Chancellor, in discussion with those individuals once that stage is reached.
My Lords, it is my privilege from these Benches also to welcome the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, to his new position. I am sure that we shall be in discussion on many issues. I have always been impressed by his grasp of whatever brief he has taken up, and I am particularly impressed by the principles he courageously displayed in taking an adverse position to that of the Government at a later date. We have a real champion there; I am sure that he will fulfil some of the aspirations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in terms of fighting for funds and so on.
The noble Lord, Lord Norton, referred to the increasing conflict between the Executive and the courts; he said that relations were increasingly strained. I agree. The tension has increased for two reasons. First, there have been unprecedented attacks on the judiciary by Ministers—one has only to think of some of the comments aimed at decisions of judges. Those comments were ill informed and would in a previous age have been regarded as outrageous. The second cause of strain is from the increasing use of judicial review, which has required the Executive to have to explain themselves and their decisions to judges. Adverse decisions by those judges always seem to be taken very hard by the Ministers concerned.
The noble Lord, Lord Norton, thought that a move to the new building across the road would make the court more isolated. I should prefer to say that it will make it more independent. It will be seen to be much more independent of the Executive than if we continued with the arrangements in this House. That independence has been demonstrated in ways that I applaud. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe, does not applaud them but I think that it is very good to have the appointments of judges taken away from politicians and the Lord Chancellor, who had a political role, and put in the hands of a commission. I was pleased that the Prime Minister announced yesterday that any remaining link with political appointments will be removed. I also welcome yesterday's Statement about the position of the Attorney-General. It is wrong to regard the Attorney-General's role as it has been exhibited in recent years at least as the final apotheosis of that position. In recent years, the essential conflict between a person who advises the Government and acts independently in the public interest has been only too clearly demonstrated. I am glad that independence of the judiciary and the legal system are on the agenda.
It is said that it is only a question of perceptions—that it is symbolic—to move across the road. One of the fine buildings in Washington is the Supreme Court; that symbolises the importance of the judiciary. In Australia, the High Court is in a wonderful modern building that demonstrates its independence of the executive in a very real way. Those are federal systems. It is significant that the Supreme Court will take over devolution issues from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In dealing with devolution issues, there may well be conflicts between the Welsh Assembly, the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Parliament and this Parliament in Westminster. It is surely appropriate that conflicts of that nature should be decided in a completely different building that symbolises independence.
I disagree with the method of funding in the Government's proposals. It is astonishing that civil litigants are required to pay through increased fees for such a building. What has the ordinary run of civil litigation got to do with the numerous cases that come before the House of Lords? Civil cases must be a fairly small percentage; I would only be guessing if I gave a figure. So much of the business of the Judicial Committee—devolution issues, issues concerning criminal matters and so on—are nothing to do with civil litigation, yet the system is apparently designed so that it is paid for in that way.
We have heard of the practical problems from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and we know that there is a long way to go before the building is complete. I look forward to it and I hope that we have a building of which we are proud, and a building of which we are as proud as we are of our independent judiciary and of the Lords of Appeal, who are the apotheosis of that system.
My Lords, it is my pleasure to welcome the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, to his new position. He comes from an area in which he had huge expertise. I wish him well as he accepts this new challenge.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for bringing this issue before us. I am sure that some noble Lords will understand it if I do so with the greatest sadness. Whenever I hear the noble and learned Lord—or the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead—I am struck by how very much this House will lose when it loses the wisdom of the Law Lords and former Law Lords, as the creators of this unnecessary court want. I hope that retired Law Lords will still come here after they have left the Supreme Court but they must all come or none must come. We cannot have just some selected; otherwise, the taint of political inducement or favouritism would touch an institution that is beyond reproach. What is government policy on peerages for former Law Lords?
We are to have the Supreme Court, so the builders are moving in. A wonderful courthouse is about to be dismembered at great expense—£57 million, as we have heard. Did no one appreciate that we already have a Supreme Court and that it operates effectively within this place and could continue to do so? Any perceived conflict is resolved by the practice of Law Lords not entering into debate on controversial topics and not sitting in relation to areas in which they had expressed a view—a view formalised by the Bingham declaration.
To rip the Law Lords and the Lord Chancellor out of this place on a whim, as Mr Blair so deplorably did, with eager support from those selfsame Liberal Democrats who now prate about concern for judicial independence, was a folly. It was opposed by at least half of the Law Lords, much of the senior judiciary and, to his lasting credit, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, the former Lord Chancellor.
It is no offence to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, if I say how sad it is that there is no Lord Chancellor, graced with all the immense legal authority and influence that that office used to command, to respond to this debate. Many noble Lords would once have found that unbelievable. A fine old mess we now find ourselves in, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, has shown, with the costs of what will become known as Falconer Towers soaring.
The Supreme Court was conceived in haste and some are now, it seems, repenting at leisure. Many will remember the then Lord Chief Justice coming to this House and telling us that he was fully satisfied with the so-called concordat that would protect judicial independence in the new framework set up by the Constitutional Reform Act. Some now find it predictable that the court came into being with fears and doubts about judicial independence and funding in future.
Mr Straw is a measured man but he will not be there for ever. The judiciary has potentially been delivered trussed and bound into the hands of a career politician on the make in another place. No expensive new courthouse will protect the judiciary from that. Even if there are no second thoughts about expelling judges from membership of this House, could we—I hope that, with his readiness to look again at Mr Blair's constitutional mistakes, the new Prime Minister will consider this—allow the Law Lords to continue to work here as they have done for so long? The noble and learned Lord has suggested that, and how sensible it seems. There would be no tying of the hands of a future Parliament; no destruction of a historic treasure of Victorian Gothic; no loss of court rooms in London that need to be replaced; no diversion of resources from other hard-pressed areas of the legal system; and a saving of taxpayers' money that could be far better spent.
If the Government truly are a changed Government, they must be ready to think again. Either all those who leave the Supreme Court must come here or none must, as I said earlier. Can the Minister assure us that the future of the judiciary will be safe and that the new Prime Minister will certainly think again on what has been proposed so far?
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for welcoming me to my first appearance at the Dispatch Box speaking on behalf of the Ministry of Justice. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble Baroness, Lady Seccombe, for their warm words of welcome and I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, who has allowed us to debate an undoubtedly important matter, for his welcome, too. In my first debate, it is somewhat daunting for me to discuss the Supreme Court with noble Lords.
Of course, the Law Lords are widely admired throughout the world. They stand at the pinnacle of our legal system. They are renowned for their robust impartiality, independence and intellectual rigour. I say at once from these Benches that the Government are absolutely determined that their translation into a Supreme Court should go as smoothly as possible, that their enduring characteristics should be carried forward and that the facilities at Middlesex Guildhall should be supportive of the Supreme Court, all those who come before it and, more generally, the wider public.
In this debate, we have reprised a number of important matters that noble Lords have discussed over the past year or so. I shall comment on one or two of those matters before turning to the substance of the question posed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd.
Whether the Lord Chancellor could be a member of the House of Commons was extensively debated. It is worth reminding noble Lords that that matter was debated during the passage of the Constitutional Reform Act and that Parliament agreed that the Prime Minister should be entitled to appoint the best person for the job, whether that person sits in the Commons or the Lords. I well remember listening to some of the debates when it was suggested that a person of very junior rank might be appointed and that the role of the Ministry of Justice, or the Department for Constitutional Affairs as was, would somehow be subordinate to other government departments. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister, in appointing my right honourable friend Mr Jack Straw, has surely signalled the Government's recognition that the Ministry of Justice is indeed a very important department of state. I have no doubt whatever that my right honourable friend Mr Jack Straw, who was appointed as Lord Chancellor on
The noble Baroness, Lady Seccombe, will know that there has been discussion on whether members of the Supreme Court could be Members of the House of Lords in the future. The White Paper on Lords reform, published in February 2007, recommended offering every retiring justice of the Supreme Court a seat in the House of Lords. The noble Baroness will know that discussions continue on Lords reform and that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister signalled in a Statement to Parliament yesterday our intention to make further progress in that area. The membership of retiring justices of the Supreme Court needs to be seen in that context.
The noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd and Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Norton, expressed considerable doubts about the philosophy of the creation of a Supreme Court. That has been debated and disposed of and I do not want to go over old ground, but we consider that, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said, the creation of the Supreme Court will achieve three main objectives: a clear separation between the judiciary and the legislature; improved access to the highest court of the land; and the renovation of a significant, but rather dilapidated, building. We believe that locating the apex of the judicial system away from the Houses of Parliament, yet right in the heart of the capital, will both symbolise its separation from the legislature and reiterate its national and international importance.
As the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, put it, the practical issues of a suitable building cannot simply be brushed aside. Yesterday, I spent a happy time sitting in a hearing of the Law Lords upstairs in the Committee Room. I then went across to Middlesex Guildhall to look at the building. The hearings of the Law Lords in your Lordships' House are enormously impressive for a lay person like me. Who could not admire the rigour of the questioning or the debate and who could not be impressed by the stature of Law Lords sitting in that Committee Room? However, I sat on a very hard bench for 20 minutes; the room was very congested; the facilities for counsel are very limited; and for members of the public the access is very difficult indeed. I could not spy a cafe or a refreshment area. Although that might be seen to be secondary to the quality of the decisions made by the Law Lords, none the less the Supreme Court of this land deserves to be housed in adequate facilities.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, that Middlesex Guildhall is an interesting building, although it is not a fine building. Walking round it, as a former local authority councillor, I thought that it reflected its municipal basis and foundation. Nevertheless, having seen the designs and having met the builders, I am convinced that the sensitive approach that has been taken will enable a modest but acceptable building to be provided in which the Supreme Court can do its job effectively.
I pay tribute to the many organisations—Westminster City Council, English Heritage and the designers—who have clearly put a considerable amount of time and energy into ensuring that a sympathetic design is produced. It is clear that the—I shall not call it "renovation"—modernisation programme that took place in the 1980s in Middlesex Guildhall was typical of much modernisation in that rather disappointing decade as regards design and architecture. The work taking place will restore some parts of the Guildhall to its original glory. It may not be as glorious as one might have hoped but, in many ways, the work being undertaken will enhance Middlesex Guildhall rather than detract from its history.
Questions have been raised about the cost of the establishment of the Middlesex Guildhall as the Supreme Court and the running costs, as well as how it is to be paid for. The noble and learned Lord the then Lord Chancellor updated Parliament on progress and costs on
Of course, I understand noble Lords questioning whether this is worth the money. It is a lot of money and, clearly, there are other necessary public expenditure services that it could have been spent on, including resources within the legal system. I fully accept that, but surely, in view of the importance of the Supreme Court and its having acceptable facilities to discharge justice, it is not a wasted figure. Of course, we must ensure that we are rigorous in controlling those costs and that the running costs of the Supreme Court are kept within balance, although noble Lords have tonight expressed rather mixed views to me on this. They have expressed concern about the cost, but also concerns about the role of the Executive in the budgeting. We clearly have to ensure—and I am sure that the Supreme Court will want to ensure—that the public have value for money. Equally, it is important that there are sufficient resources to enable the Supreme Court to do its job effectively.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, made a number of points about fees, as did other noble Lords. Noble Lords will be aware that the intention is that civil fees for the Supreme Court will be recovered, which is estimated to make up about 50 per cent of the total cost. That will be made up of fees from appellants and a contribution from national jurisdiction. The balance between these two sources has yet to be finalised. We expect the total financial burden on lower court users to be less than 1 per cent of the total cost. The rationale for that contribution is for the Supreme Court to make a contribution to the overall wealth of the law, which is then used by all civil court cases. The Supreme Court clarifies issues of law for future use.
I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that these are matters for further discussion. He suggested, and I agree with him, that we might await the appointment of the new president and chief executive. I am happy to give him the assurance that, when those persons have been appointed, the Government will be keen to discuss these matters further with them. I thank the noble and learned Lord and his colleagues for the great amount of work that they have undertaken in helping to make this translation as smooth as possible. He paid tribute to my officials, and I am grateful to him for that. In turn, from the briefings that I have had in the past two days, I can tell him that my officials well recognise the huge amount of work that he and his colleagues have put into the preparation for what I am sure will be a successful move when it takes place. He also paid tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. I am happy to echo that tribute. The door was open to the noble and learned Lord and his colleagues, and I assure him that it remains open. Ministers are happy and eager to discuss on a regular basis any matters of concern that he may have. The timetable is tight, but we are confident that the Supreme Court is on target to open in October 2009 as planned.
The noble Lord, Lord Norton, referred to the relationship between the Executive and the courts, as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon. The Statement and the White Paper issued by the Government yesterday show a clear intent to ensure that the Executive are as fully accountable to Parliament as possible. I look forward to debating these matters in the future, but the noble Lords' remarks must be seen in the context of the Government's clear and stated intention to ensure that the Executive are properly accountable to Parliament, as they should be.
In response to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Norton, I have already said that the Government respect the independence of the judiciary and will continue to do so. I do not agree with him that moving the Supreme Court across the road to the Guildhall will in some way isolate the judiciary and undermine that independence. Surely it is the very opposite. Surely the Supreme Court will be more separately identified than the Law Lords are now. It will be more transparent. Through that, it will not invite pressure from the Executive. It will clearly identify to the public the quality and value of the work undertaken by the Law Lords—
My Lords, not at all. I am responding to the noble Lord's point suggesting that moving the Law Lords into the Supreme Court as a separately identified entity will somehow introduce untoward pressure on them. I reject that. I believe that separate identification will enhance the credibility of and public respect for the work of the Supreme Court. I assure noble Lords that the Government are determined to ensure that we have a proper building on time and that the new Supreme Court will enjoy thorough independence from and the respect of the Government, as well as the respect of the public.
Once again, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, for allowing us to discuss this important issue. I am sure that we will take careful note of the many constructive comments made by noble Lords tonight.
My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure until 8.30 pm.