Clause 36 — Privacy and Civil Liberties Board

Bills Presented – in the House of Commons at 6:00 pm on 16 December 2014.

Alert me about debates like this

Photo of Diana R. Johnson Diana R. Johnson Shadow Minister (Home Affairs) 6:00, 16 December 2014

I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 36, page 22, line 14, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

“(1) The Secretary of State shall by regulations made by statutory instrument establish a body to—

(a) provide advice and assistance to the persons appointed under—

(i) section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006,

(ii) section 31(1) of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing &c. Act 2010, and

(iii) section 20(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, in the discharge of their statutory functions;

(b) review the operation, effectiveness and implications of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, the Counter­Terrorism Act 2008, this Act, and any other law or prerogative power to the extent that it relates to counter-terrorism;

(c) consider whether such legislation contains appropriate safeguards, is proportionate and remains necessary;

(d) review intelligence-sharing guidance and practice to the extent that it relates to counter-terrorism and the functions of the Board;

(e) make recommendations to any public authority about the exercise of its statutory functions relating to the prevention of terrorism;

(f) undertake inquiries relating to counter-terrorism when invited to do so by the Home Secretary, the Treasury or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, or on the initiative of the Board;

(g) encourage good practice in the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of terrorism.

(h) provide advice and assistance to Government on the development and implementation of policy relating to the prevention of terrorism.”

This expands the remit of the body to match that which is described in the Government‘s Terms of Reference for this body

.

Photo of Gary Streeter Gary Streeter Conservative, South West Devon

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 23, in clause 36, page 22, line 22, leave out “Privacy and Civil Liberties Board” and insert “Counter Terrorism Oversight Panel”.

This would rename the body created by Clause 36.

Amendment 25, in clause 36, page 22, line 25, at end insert

“in accordance with the Code of Public Appointments”.

Amendment 26, in clause 36, page 22, line 32, at end insert—

“(i) the information-gathering powers of the board;

(j) reporting requirements, and the formulation of and consultation on an annual work plan;

(k) the access to such relevant classified material as may be required in order for the board to undertake its functions under subsection (1);”

This increases the points that have to be included in regulation brought forward by the Secretary of State to include information gathering powers, formulation of an annual work plan and relevant to classified material.

Amendment 8, in clause 36, page 22, line 32, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under section (3) shall include provision requiring the board to undertake an inquiry into the retention of and access to data relating to professions that operate under a duty of confidentiality.”

Amendment 9, in clause 36, page 22, line 34, at end insert—

“(4A) Regulations under section (3) shall provide for the membership of the board to include representatives of professions who operate under a duty of confidentiality.”

Amendment 10, in clause 36, page 23, line 9, at end insert—

““professions who operate under a duty of confidentiality” shall include, but not be limited to, journalists, legal representatives, medical professionals and Members of Parliament.”

Clause 36 stand part.

Clause 37 stand part.

Amendment 18, in clause 38, page 23, line 31, at end insert—

“(4A) The Secretary of State must consult with Welsh Ministers before making provisions under subsection (1) so far as relating to any Measure or Act of the National Assembly of Wales.

(4B) The Secretary of State must consult with Scottish Ministers before making provisions under subsection (1) so far as relating to any Act or instrument of the Scottish Parliament.

(4C) The Secretary of State must consult with the Northern Ireland Executive before making provisions under subsection (1) so far as relating to any Act or instrument of the Northern Ireland Assembly.”

This would ensure that the Secretary of State could not amend legislation from the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly or Northern Ireland Assembly without first consulting with the Scottish or Welsh Governments or the Northern Ireland Executive.

Clauses 38 to 41 stand part.

Government amendment 12.

Clauses 42 and 43 stand part.

New clause 3—Intercept Evidence—use in legal proceedings

“(1) Section 18 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c.23) is amended as follows.

(2) After paragraph 1(f) insert—

“(g) any proceedings relating to an offence which, if committed in England and Wales at the time of the conviction, would have constituted an offence triable only on indictment (“an indictable-only offence”) under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.””

This new Clause removes the exclusion of intercept evidence from legal proceedings in criminal prosecutions.

New clause 7—Review of Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament resources and powers

“The Secretary must, within a reasonable time period, consult the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament and lay a report before Parliament within six months of the commencement of this Act, on the resources and powers of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.”

Photo of Diana R. Johnson Diana R. Johnson Shadow Minister (Home Affairs)

This group of amendments relates to the Government’s plans to create a privacy and civil liberties board. Clause 36 does not actually tell us very much—it is an enabling clause—so I have tabled amendments 24 and 25 to allow us to debate what the board will actually do.

As the clause is currently drafted, we have a name for the board, and there are three possible ways it could go. First, we have an idea of what a privacy and civil liberties board could look like from its name, which invokes the idea of a body with a wide remit of work on privacy and civil liberties issues in the United Kingdom, and which would safeguard human rights. Such a body would be very similar to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which was created by a Labour Government.

Secondly, the Home Office has published terms of reference, which suggest a body that will support the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in providing oversight of counter-terrorism legislation in the UK and investigating the operation of that legislation. We think that what is contained in the terms of reference is sensible and would provide both capacity and openness in the oversight of counter-terrorism policy. However, as I have said, clause 36 is quite an empty provision at the moment.

The third possible version of the board is as currently constituted in clause 36, which gives the Home Secretary powers to create—in future, if she wishes to do so—procedures, membership and the work plan for the board and provisions on publishing of reports. All those details are left to future secondary legislation.

If the body is created it is important that it has strong powers. Our amendments 23 to 26 would help achieve that. The post of independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has been around for over 40 years and its current formulation was created by a Labour Government. The post works well, and both holders of it since 2001 have served with real distinction. That does not mean that we are opposed to further strengthening of the oversight arrangements. Earlier this year, the current independent reviewer, David Anderson, QC, identified the limitations of his reviewer role, including the fact that it was restricted to certain statutes and the fact that significant powers, including those in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, were excluded and were therefore going unreviewed. He also pointed out that as a part-time reviewer without proper administrative support, he has extremely limited capacity.

Photo of David Davis David Davis Conservative, Haltemprice and Howden

I guess that the precursor of the proposal is the organ with exactly the same name in the United States, which was activated only after the Snowden events, when information was not just put in the public domain but became controversial and raised issues in Washington. The danger is that the body becomes toothless, does not have investigatory powers and cannot pre-empt a future Snowden. It seems to me that the most important aspect of that is the investigatory powers, not the rest.

Photo of Diana R. Johnson Diana R. Johnson Shadow Minister (Home Affairs)

I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will contribute to the debate, and I certainly have things to say about the title of the body and what it will be doing.

It is important to note what David Anderson said about being a part-time reviewer without proper administrative support and limited capacity. If the proposals on clause 36 were meant to address those concerns, they do not achieve that. They do nothing to address the areas of counter-terrorism legislation excluded from the remit of the commissioners, such as those in the 2008 Act, the powers in this Bill or use of the royal prerogative. David Anderson notes:

“These omissions reduce confidence in counter-terrorism law and are hard to understand, particularly after the Home Secretary agreed, as recently as March 2013, that ‘the scope of the Independent Reviewer’s responsibilities should keep pace with changes to primary legislation’, and accepted in principle my recommendation that the 2001 and 2008 Acts ‘should be examined with a view to extending your statutory functions to include the review of relevant sections of those Acts’. Indeed, as initially proposed in July, the functions of the PCLB would have extended to both these Acts.”

The Bill does not address issues of capacity and resources for the independent reviewer, either, although the impact assessment suggests that the board will receive far greater resources than those given to the independent reviewer. The cost of members of the board seems to take up much of that, and the impact assessment anticipates that the rate will be £897 a day. Is that correct and will the Minister comment on it?

The work that members of the board will do is not clear, either. The current reviewer describes the relationship between the independent reviewer and the proposed new board as

“ill-defined and potentially problematic” and goes on to say that

“the idea is…for the Board ‘to provide advice and assistance’ to the Independent Reviewer. Both advice and assistance are always welcome: but the former, including from the most eminent and knowledgeable quarters, is already frequently sought and freely given, whereas the latter is critically lacking. To require the Independent Reviewer to chair a Board…will make further claims on the Independent Reviewer’s time and could easily lead to competing priorities and inefficiencies. For there to be a net benefit, commensurate with the cost of resourcing the Board, its members will have to be doers rather than talkers, willing to accept direction in relation to often unglamorous researching and writing tasks.”

The Bill does not make provision for this, nor does the impact assessment’s description explain who will undertake the research and assistance roles that are so badly needed.

Finally, there is an issue about access to documents. Will the panel be security-cleared to the same standard as the independent reviewer? Will the staff? What will be the procedures for redacting documents either before they are passed on to the board or before they are published? These are the issues we are trying to address with our amendments. Amendment 24 has been tabled to ensure a board with a statutory remit that includes the areas that the independent reviewer does not cover. It will also ensure that the board could respond to other areas of considerable and understandable public concern about the operations of counter-terror policy. We want the board to consider not just privacy but other human rights impacts, as well as the effectiveness of counter-terror policy. As David Anderson points out, counter-terrorism oversight in the past has taken strength from not being limited. If the office of the independent reviewer has influence with the authorities, it is in part because the reviewer can make recommendations to improve not just the fairness, but the effectiveness of counter-terrorism law.

Importantly, especially given the earlier discussions about the breadth of public bodies going to implement Prevent, we also want the board to be allowed to make recommendations to public bodies and public authorities. We tabled amendment 25 in particular to ensure that appointments to this body are made in line with the code of public appointments. We want the board to include real experts who will be able to access materials and provide real insight. We do not want a body compiled through patronage. We tabled amendment 26 to ensure that the statutory instrument creating this body addresses key questions about information gathering, reporting and access to documents.

We would rename the body to give it a title that reflects the nature of what it will actually do. As I said, the current name is misleading. As David Anderson has pointed out, the name not only offers little clue as to the function of the proposed body, but suggests a pure civil liberties watchdog, which this is not. It is not clear why privacy is singled out. Other important human rights are potentially infringed by counter-terrorism law, including the right to liberty, the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression. Mr Anderson takes issue with the word “board”, which he feels is better suited to the historic management of waterways than to the rigorous exercise of scrutiny under the direction of an independent reviewer. So Labour would call the board “a counter-terrorism oversight panel”, and we would give it the powers to back that up.

If the Government are genuinely committed to creating the body they outline in the terms of reference, they should accept these amendments without any hesitation. Of course, this is only part of the oversight package that we require. When the Justice and Security Bill was before the House, the Opposition suggested a number of ways of strengthening the Intelligence and Security

Committee to give it a stronger, more independent and more open remit. We remain absolutely committed to the ISC and want it to continue to play a vital role in the oversight of the security agencies alongside a more prominent role for the intelligence commissioners, which is why we tabled new clause 7.

Let me turn briefly to the miscellaneous provisions, particularly clause 38, to which I have tabled amendment 19. Under clause 38, the Secretary of State can make changes that are

“consequential on any provision of this Act” in any piece of legislation made by any UK legislative body, including the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. This is important because under part 5, and particularly under clauses 21, 24 and 30, the Bill creates obligations on a range of bodies that are otherwise entirely devolved. As I mentioned in speaking to an earlier group of amendments, I do not think the Home Secretary should be able to amend devolved legislation without first consulting the relevant Government. That is why we tabled amendment 19, which I hope the Minister will feel able to accept.

Photo of David Davis David Davis Conservative, Haltemprice and Howden

I shall speak to new clause 3, tabled in my name. It is entitled “Intercept Evidence—use in legal proceedings”. It is a probing amendment and I do not propose to press it to the vote on this occasion. If I had wanted to press it, I would have included in the new clause the relevant legal machinery required, which is complex but not difficult to achieve if I wanted to do so. My aim is to provoke some sort of non-partisan debate on what is the cornerstone of counter-terrorism strategy—the legal treatment of intercept evidence. If need be, depending on what the Minister says and what the Government do in the meantime, I shall come back to the issue on Report.

The United Kingdom is unique among major western powers—common law powers and European Union countries—in not allowing the use of intercept evidence in court. I shall come on to the few exceptions in a moment. Why is that the case? It is difficult to know. GCHQ and its predecessor has always resisted putting any intercept evidence into the public domain. Frankly, this has probably been the case since the invention of the telephone. In the early days, I suspect it happened because gentlemen thought it ungentlemanly to listen in on other people’s conversations. Today, however, the argument advanced by the agencies concerns the protection of technique and capacity. Their attitude is very different from that of every other agency of its sort in the world. All our allies in the “five eyes” countries and beyond are equally concerned about protecting capability, but they also give high priority to the prosecution and conviction of terrorists and those who commit serious crimes. They manage to square that circle, but we do not appear to be able to do so at present.

The fact that we cannot use intercept evidence makes it more difficult for us to secure convictions in court in terrorism and serious crime cases. Lord Lloyd of Berwick has talked of the

“”difficulty of obtaining evidence on which to charge and convict terrorists, particularly those who plan and direct terrorist activities without taking part in their…execution”.

Obtaining such evidence is incredibly important to those who must deal with the al-Qaeda style of terrorist operation, in which the bit players disappear in a cloud of vapour as they carry out their evil tasks.

I pay attention to Lord Lloyd because he is an appeal judge, a past Interception Commissioner, the man whom the last Conservative Government put in charge of reviewing all terrorism legislation, and a strong advocate of the use of intercept evidence in court—as, indeed, are the past Director of Public Prosecutions Ken Macdonald and the past Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith, along with a large number of senior police officers who are in charge of counter-terrorism.

The result of not being able to use intercept evidence in court is the greater difficulty of securing convictions. That in turn has been used to justify indefinite detention under part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, control orders and terrorism prevention and investigation measures, and the proposals for first 90, then 42, then 28 days of detention without charge. I am glad to say that all those proposals were defeated, or have subsequently been revoked.

What is perhaps worst of all is that the difficulty of securing convictions encourages our counter-terrorism agencies—both the intelligence agencies and the police agencies—to rely too much on disruption rather than prosecution. As Lady Hermon is present, let me add that that approach patently failed in Northern Ireland. It leaves too many terrorists on the streets, and leaves the agencies with a bigger job and a very difficult, perhaps impossible, task of assessment. That is clear from the report from the Intelligence and Security Committee on the Lee Rigby murder. The agencies fell down on the assessment of the murderers, who were known to them. The 7/7 bombers were also known to the agencies, but were judged to be too far down the list of 2,000 suspects. The problem is made worse by the failure to prosecute terrorists and to imprison terrorists after their convictions, and the lack of intercept evidence makes it worse still.

GCHQ told the Chilcot inquiry, and the subsequent Privy Council committee, that the use of intercept evidence would not deliver many extra convictions, but it is very hard to square that with evidence from other countries. When I was looking into the matter seven or eight years ago, I went to America to speak to all the various “three letters of the alphabet” agencies over there, as well as—most important in this context—the Department of Justice, about their use of intercept evidence. The man who was the second-highest-ranking representative of the Department of Justice—the highest-ranking non-political appointee—said that not a single terrorism or organised crime case had been successfully prosecuted in the United States without the use of intercept evidence, which was a major part of its massively successful counter-terrorism and counter-Mafia operations.

I have mentioned the Mafia and counter-organised crime operations because the problems involved are quite similar. Obtaining witnesses is difficult, as is obtaining intelligence. Those people kill their witnesses, and they are very clever about their use of communications. The organised crime syndicates in America are better advised than the likes of al-Qaeda by lawyers and technical people. The Americans have something called a CIPA process—CIPA stands for “Confidential Information Protection Act”. There is a CIPA court, which is a bit like the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. It involves security-cleared prosecution and defence counsel and a security-cleared judge, and all its hearings take place in secret.

That court decides on what evidence can be put to the main trial. This is a big battle that goes on. It prevents malevolent fishing expeditions by malevolent or badly judged lawyers, but it ensures that both sides of the case get proper treatment and proper justice is delivered. He said: “If we win the CIPA case, the main case goes straight to plea bargaining”—in other words, the other side gives in and accepts the outcome. He viewed the British approach as “incomprehensible.”

It is not just the Americans; all the other English-speaking peoples in the “five eyes” do much the same. In 2006, Australia, under its intercept arrangements delivered just short of 1,500 convictions—a combination of serious crime and counter-terrorism work. Its director of public prosecutions was even fiercer. His words at that time were: “If you don’t use intercept against terrorists, you are not being serious.” There are various problems in the UK under the European Court of Human Rights regime which make things a little bit more risky for us than for others, but there are nevertheless issues that can be dealt with.

The agencies talk about protecting methods or techniques and operations. They are both perfectly legitimate concerns and we need to deal with them. Let us deal first with methods or techniques. GCHQ is good but it is no better than the National Security Agency and it is tiny in comparison with the NSA. The techniques that are used to intercept are commonly in the public domain in court in all of the “five eyes” countries—in America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In the days of the internet, we can get court records from around the world, and if we are worried about al-Qaeda knowing what we are doing, it can know by looking at every other country in our alliance, because they do the same things. So I do not think that that argument—the argument of technique—stands up much at all, but we can protect it.

The second question is about protecting individual operations and agents and I will come back to that. This is manageable, too. All the countries—the USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Israel—have techniques for certification and warranting that explicitly protect operations and operational security, again from malevolent defence lawyers going on fishing expeditions. I will cite the example later.

Before I go any further, we should be clear that there is a range of exceptions to the ban on intercept evidence in court. One exception is intercepts carried out in other countries. We have this extraordinary arrangement in our law that means we can use intercepts arrived at abroad but not in the UK, so quite how we deal with the issues of protection of technique and operations in that regard is interesting and debatable. A number of the suspects who were charged after the Heathrow bomb plot were not convicted and some of those lack of convictions were critical. Three in particular—Ali, Sarwar and Hussain—were so critical that they were retried. The evidence that convicted them was e-mail intercept evidence obtained from Yahoo! in California. It led to their conviction in 2008. That demonstrates straight away the value of intercept in difficult cases. Those intercept data were not initially released because the US felt at first that it compromised an existing operation—against a man called Rashid Rauf in Pakistan. He disappeared or died—we do not know which—under strange, mysterious circumstances, and the information was then available because that operation was no longer sensitive. That is a simple example of both the effectiveness of the mechanism and the fact that we can control the information using American or other “five eyes” processes to release it when appropriate, and do it safely.

There are two other exceptions to the use of intercept evidence in court that the House should be aware of. The first is the intercept of telephone and other communications out of prisons, which is open. For example, the Soham killer, Ian Huntley, was convicted largely on the basis of intercept evidence arrived at from there. The second is bugging. If we bug a phone, we can use the information, but if we intercept the phone we cannot. That is an extraordinary distinction, particularly given that if we put a physical bug in the phone I am holding, we could use the data, but if we put a software bug in it, we cannot. That is an astonishing piece of out-of-date law and it needs to be brought up to date.

As I said, the intercept ban inevitably pushes agencies towards disruption rather than prosecution, which, of course, is inevitably less effective and leads to a progressively more difficult problem for agencies over time. The Privy Council committee very nearly recommended allowing a tentative use of intercept evidence some time ago, after Chilcot, but it appeared to be put off by one case that came up at the last minute—Natunen v. the Finnish Government. The ECHR stepped into that case, which revolved around intercept, and struck down the conviction. Natunen had been convicted as a drugs smuggler and some intercept evidence had been used in the case. It turned out that the police had destroyed some other intercept evidence that could have been—may have been—exculpatory. That case shocked the Privy Council committee. The reason for the change of stance at the last minute, as I understand it, was that Chilcot laid out five principles, a couple of which said, “The agencies have at all times to control the recording, transcription, storage and, by implication, the possible destruction of any evidence, and this should only be under the agencies’ control, not under judicial control.” Of course that leads to a problem—if they destroy evidence without judicial control, the balance in a court case may be changed—and so that cannot be done. It seems to me that we need to revisit that issue and start to try to copy some of the techniques used by other countries.

This matter is very technical on one level but straightforward on another, and I go back to what I said about how the Americans do it. They have a court that goes through this information and sifts out what is available to put before the court, which is fair to both sides and does not allow the compromising of proper intelligence operations. That court is very like SIAC, a court we already use and which can hear intercept evidence. Although SIAC has had its rulings overturned from time to time by the ECHR, it has never been given any sort of instruction to put that intercept evidence in the public domain or make it available to people who are perhaps not responsible. So this issue is capable of resolution. We have been overly nervous and overly attentive to the understandable worries of GCHQ and the other agencies in the past. That is why those who work with this, including the police, are more—

Photo of Sylvia Hermon Sylvia Hermon Independent, North Down 6:15, 16 December 2014

I have listened intently to the right hon. Gentleman’s contribution. Will he reflect on the fact that when we had Diplock courts in Northern Ireland they were supported by one section of the community and despised by another. We do not have Diplock courts in Northern Ireland any longer. If his proposal were to be legislated upon and we have a secret court that sits and hears all the evidence, including the intercept evidence, which I agree should be allowed into court, how does he think that would be received in Northern Ireland?

Photo of David Davis David Davis Conservative, Haltemprice and Howden

I speak as probably one of the last people to give evidence at a Diplock court. It was against a terrorist who was convicted and then, under the Good Friday agreement, promptly released—it was a very frustrating process. Of course there is a problem of acceptability with any secret court. The hon. Lady will know that I fight vigorously against the idea of secret justice, but what we are talking about here is not secret justice; it is about a decision to let into the public domain more than is currently let into the public domain. Sometimes that information is exculpatory. One of the problems that has arisen with SIAC is that the agencies have not been good at their evidence discipline. At least one case has been struck down. A special advocate called Nichol, who is now a judge, discovered that MI5 was claiming that one person against whom it was bringing a case had used a passport to cross a border one week, and then the next week had brought a case against somebody else claiming that he used the same passport on the same day in a different place. So the agencies have their weaknesses. Nevertheless, the tool is significantly better than what we have at the moment. We may use intercept evidence in terrorism prevention and investigation measures and control orders. I happen to think that TPIMs and control orders are completely ludicrous, because they leave people who should be inside prison out on the streets. They should perhaps be called non-control orders, because all the dangerous ones disappear. Of course, it is not easy and there is an issue of presentation, but if there is fair representation from both sides to decide on what information should be put in the public domain, it is as close as we can get to public justice. That is the point.

Most important of all, the agency’s job now begins to look more possible. Even some members of the Intelligence and Security Committee have been critical of the agencies. Mr Howarth criticised the agencies, saying that they seem unable to deal with the thousands of suspects that they have in front of them and sift them in such a way that they can find the ones who are really dangerous. That is what happened in 7/7, 21/7 and in the terrible murder of Lee Rigby. This tool will give us a powerful anti-terrorism weapon and make the job easier to do. It will reduce the size of the target and, at the end of the day, deliver justice. I take the view that one of the most important things that we can do with would-be terrorists and actual terrorists is to convict them in a court of law so that their own communities understand what they have been planning and then punish them properly and take them out of circulation so that they are no longer a threat to the public. We need to take this matter incredibly seriously. Frankly, it is more important than most of the other issues in this Bill, except perhaps for Prevent. The Government should get a grip of this issue after 30 years of indecision.

Photo of John Martin McDonnell John Martin McDonnell Labour, Hayes and Harlington 6:30, 16 December 2014

I congratulate Mr Davis on his consistent approach to this matter. I wholeheartedly support new clause 3, and hope that he brings it back on Report. I still cannot comprehend why intercept evidence has not been used. I have never had a satisfactory response to that in all the debates we have had.

Let me turn now to amendments 8, 9 and 10, which stand in my name. I bring the Committee back to the debates we have been having throughout this Bill and that we had during the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. I am talking about the protection of professionals, journalists in particular, who have a duty of confidentiality and secrecy. Let me remind Members of the background to this. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 has been used as a device to avoid the requirement in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for judicial authority to undertake police investigations of the operation of journalists in particular, which also means collecting data on them.

There is currently a case before the courts involving six journalists. Despite frequent freedom of information requests, there has been a complete inability to find out how much RIPA has been used by the police to investigate journalists. That puts journalists at risk, undermines the relationship that they have with their sources and puts their sources at risk.

In addition to that concern, which is now being addressed by the courts, there is the issue with regard to the European Court of Justice, which struck down the EU data retention directive. That directive explicitly recognised the importance of data retention in preventing and detecting crime. It also stated that one of the 10 principles that a state must abide by is to

“provide exceptions for persons whose communications are subject to an obligation of professional secrecy.”

The Minister helpfully allowed me, National Union of Journalists representatives and its solicitor to meet officials to discuss his earlier indication that the data acquisition code of practice would be amended to ensure that where there are concerns relating to professions that handle privileged or confidential information, such as journalism, law enforcement should give additional consideration to the level of intrusion.

The Minister kindly published the guidance last week. It is now out for consultation, which I welcome. Paragraph 3.74 states that

“applicants, giving special consideration to necessity and proportionality, must draw attention to any such circumstances that might lead to an unusual degree of intrusion or infringement of privacy, and clearly note when an application is made for the communications data of a medical doctor, lawyer, journalist, Member of Parliament, or minister of religion. Particular care must be taken by designated persons when considering such applications.”

I think that is really helpful. It does not go as far as the NUJ and others wanted, which was judicial oversight or approval in some form, but at least it gives us the basis for special considerations being taken into account with regard to journalists and others.

My amendments would simply strengthen the role of the privacy and civil liberties board, or whatever title we give it tonight as a result of various amendments. Amendment 8 would ensure that the Secretary of State publishes regulations under section (3) that include a provision requiring the board to undertake an inquiry into the retention of and access to data relating to professions that operate under a duty of confidentiality. That would allow the privacy and civil liberties board to look at how the new code of practice is operating and report on what impact it is having on the operation of journalists and those in the other professions.

Amendment 9 seeks to amend the regulations so that the membership of the board includes representatives of those professions that operate under a duty of confidentiality. In that way, we would ensure some overview of the new code of practice and of the implications for journalists and others. In addition, the voice of journalists and others in professions that operate under this duty of confidentiality would be represented and heard on the civil liberties board when it advises the Secretary of State on the overall operation of this legislation.

The amendments are in the spirit of trying to find, as we have done throughout our considerations of the Bill and the debate on DRIPA, a balance between ensuring that the authorities can investigate appropriate crime, including terrorism, and protecting those professions that work under this duty of confidentiality. It is a serious matter for journalists. There is a real concern that it might undermine their operation and put them at risk, but it would also undermine the ability of whistleblowers and others to come forward and put them at risk. As we have seen in recent cases, that might now be tested in the courts.

I do not intend to press my amendments to the vote. They put forward some points for debate. Hopefully we will get a positive response from the Minister on the inclusion of at least some review, but also perhaps representation on the board.

Photo of James Brokenshire James Brokenshire Minister of State (Home Office) (Security and Immigration)

Let me first address that last point from John McDonnell. Obviously we touched on that during our previous consideration of the Bill with regard to the code of practice under DRIPA, which has now been published, and I welcome his comments on that. We look forward to receiving feedback from him and from the NUJ on their views about our proposals as part of the consultation exercise. I understand his desire to see further scrutiny and challenge. Indeed, that examination remains ongoing on a number of different fronts. The interception of communications commissioner is carrying out a review in that area, which he intends to complete by 31 January next year. I repeat that we will of course want to consider his recommendations when we come to finalising the code, along with any other comments received. This is an important area that we have already debated. As I made clear on that occasion and am happy to reiterate, the Government recognise the importance of a free press and are determined that nothing should be done that might jeopardise that.

It is notable that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation is examining the issue more broadly. The civil liberties and oversight panel is intended to support the independent reviewer in some of his work. The Home

Affairs Committee has provided its thoughts in relation to this issue, and Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee is looking more broadly at privacy and liberty. We look forward to receiving its report in due course, which may well touch on some of the themes that the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington brought to the Committee this afternoon. Although I think his amendment is not necessary in the context of the debate today, I can reassure him about the level of scrutiny and examination that is being given to these essential points. I look forward to continuing the discussion of the matter.

On clause 36 and the Opposition amendments, the privacy and civil liberties oversight board is intended to support the independent reviewer and in so doing will provide much-needed capacity to allow the reviewer to consider a wider range of subjects than it is currently possible for one individual to undertake. However, it is right that we ensure that the statutory functions and objectives of the board are in line with those of the role it is designed to support.

Clause 36 provides for regulations to be made that would set out the detail of the board, including provisions about its composition, functions and appointment. These regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure. Clearly, this is an important matter and any changes to existing oversight must be carefully considered—the point that Diana Johnson rightly highlighted. That is why the Government will publish a full public consultation that invites comments on the proposals and provides an opportunity for all interested parties to influence key elements of the board, including its composition and appointment, some of the rights of access to documentation and the structure of the membership.

We will carefully consider the outcome of the consultation prior to bringing forward the regulations. We will invite comments on key elements relating to the organisation, membership, appointment and work programme of the board. Clause 36 already provides, subject to the outcome of the consultation exercise, that regulations may include provision about any number of the most important considerations relating to the board. That would allow the matters addressed in the amendments to be dealt with in the regulations, should it be appropriate to do so.

Photo of Sylvia Hermon Sylvia Hermon Independent, North Down

Even though part 5 does not extend to Northern Ireland, I would welcome a guarantee from the Minister that there will be at least one representative from every region of the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland has, unfortunately, a huge wealth of experience and expertise in counter-terrorism. A guarantee that there will be a member from Northern Ireland on the new board would be very helpful and reassuring indeed.

Photo of James Brokenshire James Brokenshire Minister of State (Home Office) (Security and Immigration)

I recognise the knowledge and expertise that reside in Northern Ireland. The independent reviewer has made a number of visits to Northern Ireland to satisfy himself about the application of a number of items of terrorist legislation pertaining to Northern Ireland. In the support that the board provides to the independent reviewer, it will look at those functions.

I have heard clearly the hon. Lady’s representation and when the consultation is launched, I encourage her to make representations for the appropriate changes.

The consultation will invite views on the important matter of the work programme—a point made by the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North. The Bill provides that the privacy and civil liberties board will support the statutory functions of the independent review. Its remit is therefore in line with this aim. Should the statutory remit of the independent review change in the future, this would be reflected in the role of the board. The appointments will, of course, be undertaken in accordance with best practice, but until we have decided exactly how appointments are to be made, it would be premature to prescribe the process unduly.

I turn to some of the other amendments tabled by the hon. Lady. The name of the board properly respects privacy and civil liberties. The aspects she referred to, such as broadening its scope, relate to matters of privacy and civil liberty. We therefore judge that the name of the board properly reflects its process of independent scrutiny of counter-terrorism powers to ensure that the balance is right.

On the consequential amendments, amendment 19 addresses a point that we recognise in terms of how this may apply to other related matters, including the devolved matters that the hon. Lady highlighted. In practice, we would consult devolved Administrations. However, although Parliament and, in this case, the Secretary of State could still legislate, I can see the case for statutory consultation. Accordingly, I have some sympathy with what the amendment seeks to achieve, and I do not believe that we have a particular difference of view. Therefore, if she would be minded to withdraw her amendment, I would like to reflect on how we might best achieve the objective that I think we both share.

On the ISC, the Justice and Security Act 2013 expanded the Committee’s role and remit, including formalising its role in overseeing the wider intelligence community. The budget has been doubled to £1.3 million per year, and that is reported on in more detail in the ISC’s annual report. This additional funding has strengthened the ISC, as is already being seen in the work it has undertaken in its scrutiny of the agencies through the new powers. As recently as 25 November, the ISC laid before Parliament a memorandum of understanding, which, in addition to addressing certain matters in the Justice and Security Act, sets out the overarching principles governing the relationship between the Committee and the parts of Government that it oversees, including its remit and powers. It is important that we allow the new memorandum of understanding to bed down properly before we institute another review. Therefore, I am not currently minded to accept the hon. Lady’s amendments.

New clause 3 was tabled by my right hon. Friend Mr Davis, who has had to step out of the Chamber. That is not intended to be any discourtesy to me in seeking to respond, and he has sent his apologies. I am grateful to him for tabling the new clause, which gives me the opportunity to debate an important issue that is recognised by many Members across the Committee. I think we all start from the same position that people who have committed a crime should be prosecuted and brought to justice. Anything that might make a successful prosecution less likely in cases where a person is guilty is clearly less than ideal and should be contemplated only where there is very good reason. The Government are committed to securing the maximum number of convictions in terrorism and serious crime cases. If a viable regime were identified, the introduction of intercept evidence might help us to do that. For that reason, the Government have sought to find a practical way to allow us to use intercept evidence in court.

A further review of the issue has been undertaken—the eighth in 21 years. It has been overseen by a cross-party group of Privy Counsellors, including Mr Woodward and my right hon. Friend Sir Alan Beith, who is in the Chamber, as well as Sir John Chilcot and a former Home Secretary, the noble Lord Howard. I am sure that the whole Committee will recognise the breadth of experience and wisdom to be found in that group. The review will be published imminently. I hope that its findings will help further to inform consideration of this legally complex issue, which is crucially important for the UK’s national security. It is vital that all options are thoroughly explored and assessed. It would be wrong at this stage to seek to make the change that my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden proposed, albeit that it was a probing amendment more than anything else.

This will probably be my last opportunity to speak in the Committee. I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for their thoughtful and constructive contributions to our three days of discussions and debate on the Floor of the House, which have added to the Bill. I have very much enjoyed taking part, and I look forward to continuing a number of these debates when we return on Report.

Photo of Diana R. Johnson Diana R. Johnson Shadow Minister (Home Affairs) 6:45, 16 December 2014

I listened to what the Minister said, in particular, about the amendments on clause 36. While I will not press them to a vote, I am minded to reserve our position until we return after the Christmas break. I thank everybody for their contributions to the Bill’s Committee stage on the Floor of the House, and wish everybody a very merry Christmas. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 36 to 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill.