Clause 1 — Considerations applying to the exercise of powers

Orders of the Day — Adoption and Children Bill — [2nd Allotted Day] – in the House of Commons at 2:11 pm on 16 May 2002.

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Votes in this debate

Photo of Andrew Turner Andrew Turner Conservative, Isle of Wight 2:11, 16 May 2002

I beg to move amendment No. 162, in page 1, line 9, after "life", insert—

', and that of any sibling or half-sibling of the child, having regard to their age and relationship.'.

Photo of Michael Lord Michael Lord Deputy Speaker (Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 159, in page 2, line 16, after "the child" insert—

'(4A) The court or adoption agency may not have regard to any estrangement of the child from his parents caused wholly or substantially by the application of provisions of this Act or of the Children Act 1989.'.

No. 1, in page 2, line 19, after "background", insert—

', subject to the proviso that such consideration shall be secondary to the matters to be considered in subsections (2) and (3).'.

Photo of Andrew Turner Andrew Turner Conservative, Isle of Wight

When I became a Member of Parliament, I did not expect to have to deal with a large number of inquiries in my constituency surgery relating to child care and adoption issues; but, in my first few months here, they were some of the most significant issues that came before me. I am glad therefore to have this opportunity to move an amendment based on my experience before and after my election.

It is said that hard cases make bad law, but it is certainly true to say that bad law makes hard cases. I hope that amendments Nos. 162 and 159—the two very simple amendments that I have proposed—will alleviate two possible injustices in the Bill. Indeed, if such provisions had been effective previously, they may have alleviated injustices that may have taken place.

It is obviously not my intention to refer in detail to any case, but I shall refer to my long association with one of the families involved—it dates back to 1999. It is almost difficult to understand, certainly from my lay position on such matters, that a decision on a child taken into care at the age of nine months in 1997 was not taken until September 2000. In other words, he spent three years and four months in a sort of limbo because of the toings and froings of the judicial and child care process, which concluded with the decision that he should be adopted.

The Bill could address two issues that may or may not have made a difference to the decision in that case, but they would certainly have made the proceedings fairer, and I address those issues in my two amendments. Amendment No. 162 relates to families where one child is being put forward for adoption, but other children may not be. Clause 1 clearly states:

"The paramount consideration of the court or adoption agency must be the child's welfare, throughout his life."

Of course, if children come from a family, there may be more than one child whose welfare should be considered. The fact that one child is being put forward for adoption does not in any way diminish the responsibility of the court to take account of the interests of the other children. The clause, however, refers to the child who is the subject of the proceedings; it does not refer at all to children who may not be the subject of proceedings.

My first amendment therefore proposes that the interests of a sibling or half-sibling should also be of paramount consideration, having regard to their age and relationship to the first child. Clearly, if the sibling is an older brother who is away at university and has little contact with a child of nine or 10 months, the court may wish to place less emphasis on that relationship than on that of, say, a twin, particularly if the twins were six years old. If one is put forward for adoption and the other is not—I realise that this may be unusual—it seems wrong that the second child should not be considered on an equal basis with the first. That is the reasoning behind amendment No. 162.

Photo of Meg Munn Meg Munn Labour/Co-operative, Sheffield, Heeley 2:15, 16 May 2002

Does not the hon. Gentleman think that it is important for each child's concern to be considered individually? Their needs in relation to their family relationships with siblings and other family members are dealt with in subsection (4)(c) and (f). That is the appropriate way to consider the needs of siblings.

Photo of Andrew Turner Andrew Turner Conservative, Isle of Wight

I agree with the hon. Lady's first proposition but not with her second. The reason for that is to do with the word "paramount". If one child's interests are paramount, those of the other child are, by definition, of less importance—they must be taken account of but they are not equal. I see no reason why two children in the same family who may be of the same age should be treated unequally by the courts in relation to such proceedings. Clearly, an effect on one may be equal on another; indeed, it may be equal and opposite on another. I accept the intention of subsection (4), but it does not deal with the issue of the word "paramount".

Amendment No. 159—my second amendment—considers the length of time that proceedings can go on and the effect of that estrangement on the natural parents of a child. I should like to refer to the judgment in the case that I have in mind. Among other things, it states:

"There has been delay in this case"— three years and one month's delay. It continues:

"The obvious consequence of this is that"— the child—

"has been able to become more firmly settled in the home of"— the prospective adopters—

"whilst contact with his parents and"— his sister—

"has continued at a level which would usually be regarded as inconsistent with a plan for adoption."

That is the judgment. It seems incredibly unfair to parents who are simply pursuing their rights, as the local authority is pursuing the rights of the child, under this and other legislation, that the passage of time should lead to the estrangement of the child to such an extent that the court may consider that nothing may have been wrong in that relationship except the passage of time. In the case that I have in mind, no charge has ever been preferred against either parent, and no arrest has ever been made of either parent. The only reason that I can see, in reading the judgment, is the passage of time.

I accept, of course, that three years and one month in the case of a child who was four at the time of adoption is a very long time. That period allows much time for the formulation of bonds with the foster parents and prospective adopters. However, the parents concerned feel deeply that it is unfair that the court should take into account that estrangement, which is not their fault, when deciding on adoption.

Photo of Sandra Gidley Sandra Gidley Liberal Democrat, Romsey

Unfortunately, I feel that the amendments are unnecessary, although I listened with great interest to Mr. Turner. Everything that we need is written down in black and white in clause 1(2):

"The paramount consideration of the court or adoption agency must be the child's welfare, throughout his life."

The court is considering the child who is being adopted and must put his or her interests first.

I was moved by the hon. Gentleman's example of a case involving twins, who might be split at birth, which would have a profound effect on them. Ultimately, however, the court must deal with the case before it and put that child first. When considering a placement for a child, the situation of siblings and half-siblings must be taken into account, but all those considerations cannot be paramount.

Similarly, amendment No. 1, which would downplay considerations of ethnicity and religion, is well meaning, but misguided. It is right and proper that some consideration should be given to the religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background of the child. However, that must not become an absolute credo. Perhaps that is what the amendment is aiming at. In the past, social workers have sought a perfect fit. In today's culturally diverse society, one could search in vain, for example, for someone who is one eighth Pakistani, three quarters Welsh and one eighth Scottish. What is far more important is that the child should find a place in a loving home that can provide the best care and love available for a child in need—nothing more and nothing less.

I am not a regular churchgoer, but I recognise that for some people acknowledgement of their religion is very important. If a person or a couple felt that they had to give a child up for adoption, the assurance that religion would be a prime concern would be powerful. Christians baptise their children at a very young age and would want to ensure that that commitment was honoured. They would believe that doing so was fundamental to the child's spiritual welfare. It is important that we retain the religious element, whatever the religion.

Having said that, the amendment would serve a purpose. When a social worker has to decide about a placement, I suspect that it is always a case of balancing all the complex factors and influences in an attempt ultimately to achieve what is right for the child.

Photo of Julian Brazier Julian Brazier Opposition Whip (Commons)

Although I welcome the thinking behind the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend Mr. Turner, I cannot say that I support them. On amendment No. 162, my hon. Friend is right that the welfare of siblings is extremely important and I have also dealt with a number of harrowing constituency cases. None the less, those on the Opposition Front Bench support the view of almost all people concerned with adoption that the paramount consideration before a court must be the welfare of the child whose case is being considered. As Ms Munn said, there is scope elsewhere to take account of the views of siblings.

I shall focus on amendment No. 1, which we tabled. Should we not get the assurances that we seek from the Government, I should like a separate vote on that amendment. Almost every critic of the adoption system has focused on the delays. It is extremely rare that an adoption goes through in the 12-month period that is now the Government's target. Sometimes, they can take three or four years. In most cases, they do not happen at all.

The reasons for the delay are many. One factor that is mentioned again and again is what Sandra Gidley, who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, described as seeking the "perfect fit". No one in this House would disagree with clause 1(5) when it states that the court or adoption agency must pay

"due consideration to the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background."

The Opposition's concern is that that consideration is being put on a par with subsection (3), which refers to delay, hence our amendment, which would ensure that subsection (5) should be

"subject to the proviso that such consideration shall be secondary to the matters to be considered in subsections (2) and (3)," that is, the paramountcy and delay provisions.

I shall give the House two examples, the first of which made the national press. A single mixed-race woman of independent means was approved as an adopter. Through the adoption agency concerned she found a child who had been in care since she was a baby. Babies are the easiest children to place and it is disgraceful that there should have been such a delay in placing a baby. The child was two and a half years old at the time. Although the woman was of mixed race, it was a slightly different mixture from the child, but each of them had a middle eastern and a European element. The woman, however, was Christian and the baby came from an Islamic background. Islam has no tradition of adoption. Children who cannot be cared for by their own parents are normally looked after within the extended family. After a lengthy delay, the woman was turned down on both racial and religious grounds. By that time, the child had been in care for three years. No other adopter was in sight.

If a court were faced with that case, is clause 1, as drafted, clear? Is what Parliament intends clear—that delay must override those other considerations if necessary? I do not believe that it is and that is why we want those innocuous extra words added to make it clear which subsection overrides which—that delay is more important than those other factors.

Photo of Meg Munn Meg Munn Labour/Co-operative, Sheffield, Heeley

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the fact that one or two cases of that nature, which are indeed a cause for concern, get into the national press shows that common sense prevails for the vast majority of children? Children are placed in loving families that best meet their needs. If those families can match their cultural, linguistic and racial characteristics, that is the best case, but that is not achieved for the vast majority. Therefore, a good match is found and children are placed quickly in loving homes. To suggest that the paramountcy provision is not paramount is nonsense.

Photo of Julian Brazier Julian Brazier Opposition Whip (Commons)

I agreed with the last point made by the hon. Lady, for whom I have the greatest respect, but I could not disagree more strongly on these matters. Study after study in the past few years—including the Prime Minister's own review—has identified the delay that is endemic in the system as one of its greatest single weaknesses. The plain fact is that the vast majority of children in care—even those who have been in care for several years—are not satisfactorily adopted. The most recent figures that I have seen show that about 1,500 adoptive parents are still waiting for children. Therefore, I do not accept the hon. Lady's argument.

Photo of Gary Streeter Gary Streeter Vice-Chair, Conservative Party

I am sure that my hon. Friend supports the Government's aim to increase the number of these children who are adopted. Those of us whose friends have tried to adopt know that they have encountered bureaucratic difficulties and delays. Adoption is not an easy process for many people at present. Does he agree that if the Government could streamline that process and deal with the problem of delay, we would be well on the way to increasing the number of children adopted, which would be one practical measure to emerge from our proceedings?

Photo of Julian Brazier Julian Brazier Opposition Whip (Commons) 2:30, 16 May 2002

My hon. Friend is right. Indeed, the Government have stated that it is their purpose to deal with delay.

Let me give one more example. A couple who contacted the Adoption Forum lived in a racially mixed area of central London, which was reflected in their circle of friends. In 1996, they successfully adopted a seven-year-old white English boy into their family. In 1999, they applied to adopt his mixed-race older half-sister who wanted to live with them. The local authority concerned—I will not name it, but it has one of the poorest records on adoption and is at the bottom of the adoption league table—refused the placement on the grounds that she was of mixed race and the couple were white. The ruling has had a detrimental effect on their relationship with the son and, even more so, between the son and his sister. The girl remains in foster care and has suffered because of having to had move many times.

Photo of Jonathan R Shaw Jonathan R Shaw Labour, Chatham and Aylesford

We discussed that matter in Committee. One of the key things that we picked up from the evidence sessions, which were many and worth while, was that we do not want hard and fast rules when we deal with adoption. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that one of the keys to increasing adoption to meet the Government's target of 40 per cent. is for adoptions to be successful? I do not want delays in the process, but it is crucial that we get assessments right. Nothing could be worse for a child than to be placed with an adoptive family and for that placement to break down. The consequences of that are perhaps even worse than a delay. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that assessment is crucial and that it is vital and paramount to take account of matters in the Bill?

Photo of Julian Brazier Julian Brazier Opposition Whip (Commons)

Assessment is important, but cross-racial adoptions do not always fail, a point repeatedly made by a number of Labour Members. The Minister for Policing, Crime Reduction and Community Safety made that point when he was Minister of State, Department of Health. In the debate on the Adoption and Children Bill that fell just before the election, my right hon. Friend David Davis asked that Minister's successor, the Minister of State, Department of Health, Mr. Hutton, to note that

"a requirement to match the religious background of a child with that of would-be adoptive parents has previously made it difficult to find adoptive parents."

The Minister replied:

"We have always made it very clear that we want the system to operate as efficiently and speedily as possible, and that we shall not allow issues to do with political correctness to get in the way of a child's best welfare interests."

I intervened to say:

"Just now, the Minister

"was absolutely clear about the need to eliminate unacceptable delay in the process. However, clause 1(4) omits anything about that need. Instead, that subsection includes the words 'due consideration', which, legally, are not absolutely clear cut."

I then asked the Minister:

"Could not those words make it possible for courts to return to the very political correctness against which he has rightly and repeatedly spoken?"

The Minister assured us:

"Ultimately, however, we have made it very clear that we believe that there should not be unnecessary and unacceptable delay in the process. If that is one of the issues that can give rise to delay, the Bill should address it."—[Hansard, 26 March 2001; Vol. 365, c. 704–705.]

All we want to do is to ensure that considerations are secondary to the paramountcy principle and the problem of delay.

Photo of Jacqui Smith Jacqui Smith Minister of State, Department of Health

Mr. Turner highlighted some worrying cases from his own experience, but other hon. Members reinforced the Government's position on the amendments. It is clear—we have widespread support for this—that clause 1 ensures that foremost among the principles that govern decisions on adoption is the welfare of the child throughout their life. That should be the paramount consideration. It is not to say, however, that the interests of siblings and, in particular, the relationship that adopted children have with their relatives should not be considered.

As my hon. Friend Ms Munn said, subsection (4)(f) explicitly states that courts and adoption agencies are obliged when considering a child's welfare, to consider the relationship that he or she has with relatives and any other relevant person. The definition of relatives makes it clear that that includes siblings. There is a wide-ranging obligation to consider the views and wishes of siblings and parents, which is the focus of the hon. Gentleman's amendments. As hon. Members made clear, however, it is not possible both to have paramountcy for the adopted child and to give equal consideration to another issue. That is the fundamental problem with amendment No. 162.

Government amendment No. 163 suggests that estrangement is a function of delay and should be taken into consideration. The Bill sets out important safeguards to ensure that delay does not happen. In relation to bearing down on delay, it is clear in clause 1 that courts must have regard to delay and welfare. Clause 105 introduces for the first time timetables in court to avoid delay.

The hon. Gentleman suggested that when children have been placed for a long time, the decision is, in effect, a fait accompli when they get to court. The point of the placement provisions is to bring forward either the time when parents consent to their children being placed for adoption or the time when that is determined by a placement order so that it happens much earlier in the process. In that way, we expect to avoid the problems that the hon. Gentleman identified.

On amendment No. 1, Mr. Brazier mentioned delay. We rightly debated that at length in Committee. I share his concern and desire to eradicate delay from the process wherever possible. However, clause 1 sets out the general principles that apply across the adoption provisions. Subsection (3) places a duty on courts and adoption agencies to bear it in mind at all times that any delay in reaching a decision is in general likely to prejudice the welfare of the child. Subsection (5) places an obligation on the adoption agency, when placing a child for adoption, to give due consideration to the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background. It is the interaction of those two subsections that is the focus of amendment No. 1.

The starting point in considering the issue has to be that the subsections need to be read together. That is their legal effect. Subsection (5) cannot override the obligation in subsection (3) to have regard to possible harmful effects of delay. That overarching provision applies across all decisions relating to the adoption of a child, including the placement decision. However, during the debate in Committee and in interventions today, my hon. Friends the Members for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson), for Chatham and Aylesford (Jonathan Shaw) and for Sheffield, Heeley made the important point that we must give due weight during the adoption process to the factors set out in subsection (5) that could have a significant impact on lifelong issues of identity—for example, the child's racial and cultural background.

The clause ensures that that will happen and that there is appropriate consideration. However, the Government share the concerns that have been expressed about eradicating unnecessary delay from the system. We are determined to bear down on that delay. That is why our new national adoption standards make it completely clear that while a child's ethnic origin, cultural background, religion and language should be recognised, we need also to target our recruitment efforts to ensure that there are sufficient numbers of people wishing to adopt to enable children to be placed with families that reflect these factors.

The standards are equally clear on the harmful effects of delay. They provide explicitly—almost in the words that the hon. Member for Canterbury used—that children will not be kept waiting indefinitely for a perfect family. They set challenging time scales for matching children. They state that a plan for permanence must be made once a child has been in care for four months. That plan must have clear, monitored time scales. We have issued binding statutory guidance to local authorities to enforce that.

Photo of Julian Brazier Julian Brazier Opposition Whip (Commons)

I am well aware of the circulars. The Minister will know how many local authorities ignore these binding instructions. Many children did not have care plans for many years after such plans became a statutory requirement, for example. Why will the Minister not put such provisions into the Bill so that the court rather than the social services department will recognise its duty?

Photo of Jacqui Smith Jacqui Smith Minister of State, Department of Health

There is delay before we get to the court. The importance of adoption standards, and the statutory basis for them, is that we ensure that adoption agencies bear down on delay. The standards are not optional extras, which seems to have been suggested. They are statutory guidance, and they will be expected to be in place from April 2003. We have already begun to focus on eradicating delay from the system so that we might make some progress. The average time for which a child is looked after before being adopted has fallen from three years and four months in 1996–97 to two years and nine months in 2000–01.

That is still too long, and that is why we are taking action—we began to do so after we debated these matters in Committee—to set a challenging new time scale to our adoption PSA target. Our aim will be to ensure that nationally by 2004 95 per cent. of children should be placed for adoption within 12 months of the decision being taken that adoption is in their best interests. That is a further signal of our determination to tackle harmful delay.

Through legislation and through the wider action that the Government are taking, there has been progress in reducing delay. We shall monitor progress and we shall ensure that continued progress is made to tackle harmful delay. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Photo of Andrew Turner Andrew Turner Conservative, Isle of Wight

I am happy to withdraw amendment No. 159 on the basis of the Minister's response. The hon. Lady's response to amendment No. 162, and that of my hon. Friend Mr. Brazier, who speaks from the Opposition Front Bench, illustrates a simple difference of opinion. She and my hon. Friend believe that the interests of one child should be paramount over those of another child. I believe that the interests of two children should be equal and should be considered as such. However, I realise that perhaps this is not the time to press the issue. I hope that it will be considered in another place. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Photo of Michael Lord Michael Lord Deputy Speaker (Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means)

We will move on to discuss Government amendment No. 26, with which it will be convenient to take Government new clause 6.

Photo of Julian Brazier Julian Brazier Opposition Whip (Commons)

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. What will happen to amendment No. 1?

Photo of Michael Lord Michael Lord Deputy Speaker (Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means)

We have not missed the opportunity to vote on amendment No. 1. We take amendments in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. The hon. Gentleman will have the opportunity to vote on his amendment in due course.

Photo of Julian Brazier Julian Brazier Opposition Whip (Commons)

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Will you tell us when we are likely to take a vote? We are not clear.

Photo of Michael Lord Michael Lord Deputy Speaker (Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means) 2:45, 16 May 2002

Amendments and new clauses are debated in certain groupings, but they are voted on in a different order. Amendment No. 1, on which the hon. Gentleman wishes to vote, will be dealt with after we have debated Government amendment No. 26 and Government new clause 6. He will then have an opportunity to vote.

Photo of Rosie Winterton Rosie Winterton Parliamentary Secretary (Lord Chancellor's Department)

I beg to move amendment No. 26, in page 2, line 5, after "harm", insert—

'(within the meaning of the Children Act 1989)'.

Photo of Michael Lord Michael Lord Deputy Speaker (Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 6—Meaning of "harm" in the 1989 Act.

Photo of Rosie Winterton Rosie Winterton Parliamentary Secretary (Lord Chancellor's Department)

I am pleased to move the amendment and to discuss the new clause, which I believe will assist in tackling the scourge of domestic violence and the terrible effect that it can have on children. One woman in four experiences domestic violence at some point in her lifetime. A survey undertaken in 2001 showed that one in five applications for contact with children involved allegations of serious domestic violence. We know also that 70 per cent. of children in care are likely to have experienced violence at home at some point.

I thank in particular the Women's Aid Federation of England, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, Barnardo's and the NCH for the candid and constructive way in which they have entered into discussions with me and officials from the Lord Chancellor's Department on this important subject.

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend Margaret Moran, my hon. and learned Friend Vera Baird and my hon. Friend Ms Shipley, who have all campaigned for greater protection for the victims of domestic violence.

As a result of the campaigning and our own research, the Government are acutely aware of the concerns that have been raised. We believe, as many organisations have made clear, that it is right that the interests of the child are protected and are paramount in the court process. That is why we want to clarify the provisions in clause 1, which set out the key principles that are to apply throughout the adoption provisions.

Clause 1(4) sets out a checklist of factors to which courts and adoption agencies must have regard in considering the welfare of the child. Government amendment No. 26 makes it clear that the meaning of "harm" in subsection (4)(e) of the checklist is to be the same as that used in the Children Act 1989. In other words, harm includes ill-treatment or impairment of development. We think that it is the interpretation that the courts would use anyway, but one of the aims of the Bill is to bring adoption law into line with the Children Act. It is appropriate that we spell it out for the avoidance of doubt.

During the proceedings of the Special Standing Committee, a number of children's charities and organisations, which I have already mentioned, expressed concern that not enough account was being taken of the impact on children of domestic violence. On 17 January, in Committee, I made it clear that the Government were seriously considering how these concerns could be met. First, the Government considered the approach in Northern Ireland, which seeks to ensure that domestic violence is considered in all applications for contact or residence. However, we want to go further and ensure that the impact on children of witnessing abuse is considered in all proceedings under the Children Act when the welfare checklist is used, in both public and private law. As I said, Government amendment No. 26 would extend that to adoption proceedings.

At present, a court, when deciding whether to grant contact between a parent and child, has to take into account the welfare checklist in the Children Act, which includes considering whether a child has suffered or is at risk of suffering any harm. New clause 6 amends the definition of harm in the checklist to include a harm that a child has suffered or is at risk of suffering as the result of witnessing the abuse of others, including domestic violence and violence which, while not domestic, may nevertheless have affected the child, such as a parent continually being harassed or intimidated or a parent harassing or intimidating others.

The definition of ill-treatment is already provided for in the Children Act; it is broader than physical violence, and includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment that are not physical. However, the Government recognise that amendments to primary legislation are not enough on their own; I certainly accept concerns that existing provisions in primary legislation are not being applied consistently. We therefore have in hand a broad programme of work that will provide more effective protection for children and victims of violence. I pay tribute to the president of the family division, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, who has done a lot of work to ensure that it is aware of action that courts should take.

We hope to take a number of steps, such as amending court application forms to include specific questions about violence or ill-treatment of children. We shall also amend court rules to oblige courts to determine whether violence or ill-treatment has taken place if an allegation has been made and, if so, what impact that has or is likely to have on the child. We are also looking at the way in which we can disseminate more effectively the guidelines on parental contact with children in cases of domestic violence, which were produced by the Children Act sub-committee of the Lord Chancellor's advisory board on family law.

We are aware of the many concerns about the availability of support at contact centres. We are working with the National Association of Child Contact Centres, and the Lord Chancellor's Department has launched a consultation so that we can define more effectively the support provided by such centres.

Photo of Elfyn Llwyd Elfyn Llwyd Shadow PC Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Shadow Spokesperson (Business, Innovation and Skills), Shadow Spokesperson (Communities and Local Government), Shadow Spokesperson (Culture, Media and Sport), Shadow Spokesperson (Defence)

Will the hon. Lady give the House an assurance that she is satisfied that the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service will have sufficient officers on the ground if supervision is required? I agree entirely with what she is saying and accept wholeheartedly what the Government are doing in that area, but will she nevertheless assure the House that there will be sufficient funding and manning in that part of the CAFCASS operation?

Photo of Rosie Winterton Rosie Winterton Parliamentary Secretary (Lord Chancellor's Department)

When meeting CAFCASS staff, I have been extremely impressed with their ideas on contact centres. Our priority is to ensure that we are using existing funding for contact centres effectively. Many cases involve possible domestic violence or violence against a child, so we have to make sure that proper services for supervised contact are available. We are therefore working with the National Association of Child Contact Centres to make sure that we have a good definition of such contact and eventually, through CAFCASS, can ensure that there are clusters of contact centres in each region.

I accept that we need to undertake further work, but we can make immediate changes with the amendments and secondary legislation. I hope that we will continue to work with voluntary organisations, making use of their experience and expertise to develop our proposals. The amendments send a clear message about the Government's determination to tackle domestic violence and protect children. I very much hope that that message is reinforced by support from Members on both sides of the House.

Photo of Elfyn Llwyd Elfyn Llwyd Shadow PC Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Shadow Spokesperson (Business, Innovation and Skills), Shadow Spokesperson (Communities and Local Government), Shadow Spokesperson (Culture, Media and Sport), Shadow Spokesperson (Defence)

I wholeheartedly welcome the amendments, which, if overdue, are based on good research. A 1999 survey of 130 parents by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children found that during contact 76 per cent. of the children were abused; 10 per cent. were sexually abused; 15 per cent. were physically abused; 62 per cent. suffered emotional harm, with which I suspect we are dealing in the amendments; 36 per cent. suffered neglect; and 26 per cent. were abducted. There is therefore a clear need for the amendments, and I am sure that they will receive wholehearted acceptance. Margaret Moran has campaigned long and hard on this issue, as have other Members.

The Minister said that the thrust of the Bill was to bring a particular area of law into line with the Children Act 1989; the checklist and the proposals in the amendments are both useful and helpful. Experience tells me that some of the most damaged children have witnessed violence being perpetrated on others—typically, but not exclusively, violence by the father on the mother. Often, those youngsters have not suffered physical violence per se, but have undoubtedly suffered emotional damage. I therefore welcome the amendments and the consequent change to the Children Act.

The amendments will go some way towards addressing the awful problem of emotional harm inflicted on young people and children. Like me, other Members may have received a letter from a lady from Essex. I do not have her permission, so I shall not give her name, but last week she wrote to me:

"My ex-husband received five years' imprisonment for GBH."

During his imprisonment, her ex-husband applied for contact. There were obviously good grounds for objections but, in due course, he gained unsupervised access, which is ridiculous. A violent person with a history of violence against many different people who breached a number of undertakings is unfit to have any contact at all. The lady concludes:

"Remember, contact/residence is the child's right, not the parent's. Children should never be forced to have contact."

That is quite right. I know that other Members wish to speak, so I conclude by saying once more that I wholeheartedly agree with the amendments, which are a considerable step forward.

Photo of Margaret Moran Margaret Moran Labour, Luton South

I warmly welcome Government new clause 6 and the comprehensive set of measures being discussed to tackle a difficult and sensitive issue. The Government have taken a landmark decision to recognise in child protection legislation the impact of domestic violence on a child and the harm that a child may suffer as a result of witnessing domestic violence.

The further amendments to which my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary referred require the courts, when they make contact orders, to decide whether domestic violence has taken place and, if so, its present and possible future impact on the child. That is a significant step forward in protecting our children, which is warmly welcomed not just by many hon. Members, but by a coalition of children's charities, including the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, NCH Action for Children, Barnardo's, the Children's Society and the Women's Aid Federation. The wide scope of the measure, which deals with violence and other forms of abuse that may harm a child, is particularly welcome.

The Bill extends the right of contact to unmarried parents. It is right that parents, married or otherwise, should have contact with their children in all normal circumstances, but we must ensure that where such contact takes place, the child's welfare is paramount and the necessary safeguards are in place. I welcome the restatement of that principle in my hon. Friend's remarks today.

The courts must ensure that the welfare of the child is taken seriously. The Government and children's charities recognise that as a major issue. In more than half the cases in which court welfare reports are produced, domestic violence occurs where contact is ordered. The new clause recognises the trauma caused to a child by witnessing ill-treatment.

As my hon. Friend knows, there is concern about whether case law precedents have distorted the intended meaning of the Children Act 1989. I refer to three cases in which that concern has been raised. In re H and R (Child Sexual Abuse) 1995, the House of Lords ruled that a higher standard of proof than the simple balance of probabilities is required in family law cases involving serious allegations of abuse of children. That raises concern about the welfare safeguards in the Children Act.

Similarly, in re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) 1995, the Master of the Rolls ruled that contact is almost always in the child's interest. Many children's charities are worried that these cases, alongside A v. N (Committal: Refusal of Contact) 1996, have to some extent resulted in the courts, when making contact orders, attaching insufficient importance to the welfare of the child, and particularly the safety of the child. We therefore need to restate the paramount importance of the child's welfare, and consider further ways of making that clear, whether through regulations, best practice or other measures.

We know from research carried out by the Women's Aid Federation and others that despite guidelines intended to tighten up contact proceedings and to prevent contact where there is evidence of violence or abuse to the child, it still takes place. The courts continue to grant contact, frequently unsupervised contact, to violent or abusive parents. A recent survey revealed cases in which orders for unsupervised contact were granted to schedule 1 offenders and to parents whose behaviour had resulted in children being placed on the child protection register.

In two recent cases, three children were put on the child protection register after one of them was assaulted by the father during a contact visit. Despite that, the court subsequently granted unsupervised contact to the father, and recently there has been another violent incident involving the children. The mother, who was diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome as a result of that man's violence towards her, says that she is not opposed to contact, but has repeatedly asked for visits to be supervised. One child told his teacher that he has nightmares about his mother being killed, and that he wants to die.

In another case that illustrates the point, a woman was advised by her solicitor that there was no point in contesting her violent ex-partner's application for a contact order, because the father and child had the right to see each other. The solicitor gave that advice knowing that the father is a convicted schedule 1 offender. The mother reluctantly agreed to an order that specified unsupervised contact every fortnight.

Similar cases go through the courts all too frequently. I welcome the moves in the new clause and, I hope, in subsequent discussions to consider further measures to ensure the safety of our children and to prevent them from being put at risk of severe harm, violence or abuse.

I hope that when we consider the measures that my hon. Friend outlined, we will examine closely the training of the judiciary. I understand that members of the judiciary are required to undertake only 30 minutes of statutory training in relation to domestic violence, even though more than half the cases with which many of them deal are domestic violence cases. Such minimal training cannot be acceptable for those dealing with such difficult and sensitive cases.

Photo of Andrew Turner Andrew Turner Conservative, Isle of Wight 3:00, 16 May 2002

I am pleased that the amendments have been tabled, and like many hon. Members, I have been asked to support them. However, I am concerned about a certain imbalance in the hon. Lady's—and, for that matter, the Minister's—presentation, which tended to emphasise violence by the man against the woman. I am sure that the hon. Lady will accept that the reverse is possible. Will she clarify whether the amendment is designed to cover mental cruelty as well? I see that the Minister agrees. Does Margaret Moran agree that mental cruelty can be perpetrated by the parent with care against the child by slagging off the parent without care?

Photo of Margaret Moran Margaret Moran Labour, Luton South

Of course I concede that there are instances of violence by the mother in the circumstances under discussion, although research has shown that that is infinitely less frequent than violence by the father. The new clause is gender-neutral. We are all endeavouring to prevent violence and harm to a child from either parent. Domestic violence by men against women is more prevalent; one in four women are likely to experience some sort of domestic violence during their lives.

The courts seem to believe that the Children Act 1989 contains a strong presumption of contact almost always being in the best interests of the child, but that needs to be balanced against the possible risks to the child's safety. I congratulate my hon. Friend on the work that she is doing, in conjunction with her ministerial colleagues in the domestic violence inter-ministerial group, to address such serious issues as the lack of definition and standards for supervised and unsupervised contact.

I warmly welcome the work that is being undertaken to ensure that proper contact centres are available when and where they are needed, given that only 12 per cent. of contact centres currently offer supervised contact, and most are run by excellent and worthy, but possibly less experienced, volunteers. I also strongly agree that we need to ensure consistency in court practice and make it clear to the courts that the welfare of the child means just that. I welcome the amendments and I hope that we shall have continuing dialogue on how to ensure that every measure is taken to protect our children in these circumstances.

Photo of Tim Loughton Tim Loughton Shadow Spokesperson (Health)

I support the Government's amendments, and I do so briefly, mindful of the fact that we have 94 amendments and one new clause to deal with before 3.45 pm. A later group of amendments also deals with parent contact and I hope that if we do not reach that, this important subject will be revisited in another place.

In Committee, we supported the intentions of the amendments. The Minister did a lot of work subsequently into how they could best become part of the legislation. I am glad of that, and I welcome the resulting Government amendment No. 26 and Government new clause 6. I also fully appreciate the great experience of and work done by Margaret Moran in furnishing her own amendments. They are based on much detailed work, and I am sure that the pressure that they have brought to bear has enabled the Government to move further along the road, although not as far as many of us would have wished. However, it is a good start.

We are all aware of horrendous cases of domestic violence and its effect on children—the subsequent break-up of families, homelessness problems and the psychological effects on children who are scarred for many years thereafter—many of which we heard about in Committee. We heard many alarming accounts of the injury that can be inflicted on children during contact with violent parents—mostly men, but not exclusively—resulting, in the most horrendous cases, in the death of a child. We heard some truly awful stories.

I, too, congratulate the women's refuges, the Women's Aid Federation and the Children's Society on their intensive, sensitive and effective lobbying. I declare an interest as patron of Brighton's women's refuge, which does a good job in my part of the world.

I particularly welcome the fact that the amendments extend the definition of harm to include the damage done to children witnessing the results of domestic violence between parents in the home without their having to be an eye witness to that domestic violence. That is domestic violence, although not in the strict sense of the definition that we have had. It is right that the Minister has taken account of that because it all constitutes ill-treatment and abuse, which has devastating effects on children who may then end up being the subject of adoption orders.

I know that there will be problems of definition in the courts. I, too, have spoken to family division judges who have said that it is already a problem. However, the amendment and the new clause send out a clear statement of intent to judges and to the courts that the Government take the problem seriously, as do we. It is right that those factors should be taken into account when considering contact orders and what is best for the child's welfare, which is, after all, what is at the heart of the Bill.

As the Minister says, the amendment goes further than the Northern Ireland model and much of this will also have a bearing on the sort of adoption support services that are structured within the Bill. I echo the concerns raised by Mr. Llwyd, who was an active member of the Committee, including his concerns about the staffing of CAFCASS, which has been a problem and to which reference was made in Committee.

This is the first time that domestic violence has been legally recognised as a child protection issue, and I associate myself with that development. I realise that much work remains to be done and that we need to go a lot further, but that is for a more specialised piece of legislation dealing primarily with the subject. I hope that, in due course, the Government will revisit the subject, giving a greater airing to the complicated problems of domestic violence. The amendment and the new clause are a good start. They have the Opposition's full support and I congratulate the Minister on them.

Photo of Sandra Gidley Sandra Gidley Liberal Democrat, Romsey 3:15, 16 May 2002

I want to join the love-in and congratulate Margaret Moran on highlighting the issue so effectively in Committee. As a result of her work the Minister has been brought on board and introduced the relevant measures.

I was initially pleased to add my name to the extensive new clause 10, but that has been withdrawn because it needs considerable further work. I hope that that will be done in the other place, but I do not know whether there will be sufficient time.

In most cases, I agree that the interests of the child are best served by maintaining contact with both parents, but, unfortunately, as it stands, the system fails to protect children from abusers who are known to them.

Tim Loughton mentioned the lobbying that has taken place. I suspect that all hon. Members have been deluged with mail from charities and women's refuges. One cannot fail to be moved by some of the cases. Many of the letters were the same, but there were some heart-rending personal stories, including cases of children who have been murdered during unsupervised contact. That sounds melodramatic, but the 1999 survey of parents found that 76 per cent. of the children of parents interviewed had been abused in some way during the contact visits ordered by the courts. Mr. Llwyd broke those figures down even further. That is a powerful message that we must keep sight of.

In many ways, it is a great sadness that it is necessary to introduce the amendment at all, because it means that in the past we have failed. In particular, we have failed children who are too vulnerable to take care of themselves. Since being elected it has been a huge sadness to me to hear from parents who have just gone through a divorce. Invariably, children are used as pawns in an unattractive game in which the parents score points against each other. It is not uncommon for a parent, or even a grandparent or set of grandparents, to make serious allegations about the behaviour of the other party, which may be unfounded.

It is essential that strenuous efforts are made to establish the truth. I cannot emphasise that enough. If someone gets it wrong, it means that an innocent parent is being prevented from seeing their child. The balance is a fine and difficult one, but it is up to us to try to strike it. The question is vexed. We must protect our young without creating a climate where we encourage ever-escalating litigation and counter-litigation.

I support new clause 6, which improves the definition of harm in the Children Act. It is essential that we highlight the fact that domestic violence is unacceptable. Writing this speech, I was worried that if I banged on about men beating up women I would receive letters from men saying, "Hey, what about us. We get beaten up by our wives as well." But we must acknowledge that domestic violence against women is a bigger problem, and I make no apology for saying that today. However, any violence is unacceptable.

If children regularly witness domestic violence, they believe that it is the norm. Children believe that their immediate environment is the usual one and they have no experience of a kinder world. It is essential that this self-perpetuating cycle is broken and we must do all that we can to achieve that. I welcome new clause 6.

Photo of Robert Walter Robert Walter Conservative, North Dorset 3:19, 16 May 2002

I welcome the amendment and the new clause. I congratulate Margaret Moran on all the work that she has put in on the subject. I have been pleased to be associated with her in tabling amendments in Committee and new clause 10, which we have now dropped.

These are important amendments. That fact was brought home to me within the past month in my constituency surgery, when a distraught mother came to see me about a contact order that had been granted to her ex-husband although he had a record of violence and sexual abuse. The court welfare officer was indifferent to that, and the judge dismissed it out of hand and granted unsupervised access to the children.

The Government have more work to do, but if we can get this message into the Bill perhaps in time they can introduce further measures.

Photo of Jonathan Djanogly Jonathan Djanogly Conservative, Huntingdon

The discussion of contact is welcome because it was one of the most important matters that we did not discuss at all in Committee, owing to Government timetabling. That is an important point to make, not least because members of the Committee received more letters on the topic than on any other. That said, I note that the contact provisions themselves are so far down the selection list that they will probably again fail to be discussed, so it will be left entirely to the other House to review the matter.

I do not want to add much to what has been said, partly because we need to move on. I speak to many people who are not as knowledgeable as hon. Members present about the process of adoption, and they often assume that the question of contact does not often arise, because adoption involves the child being permanently taken away from the natural parents. It is important to place on the record that that is absolutely not the case in this day and age. The norm is that there will always be contact, which is right and proper. We should therefore see this as an issue that affects the vast majority of adopted children and one that it is particularly important for us to address.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment proposed: No. 1, in page 2, line 19, after "background", insert—

', subject to the proviso that such consideration shall be secondary to the matters to be considered in subsections (2) and (3).'.—[Mr. Brazier.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 115, Noes 309.

Division number 243 Orders of the Day — Adoption and Children Bill — [2nd Allotted Day] — Clause 1 — Considerations applying to the exercise of powers

Aye: 115 MPs

No: 309 MPs

Aye: A-Z by last name

Tellers

No: A-Z by last name

Tellers

Question accordingly negatived.

Photo of Jacqui Smith Jacqui Smith Minister of State, Department of Health

I beg to move amendment No. 163, in page 2, line 27, leave out from first "order" to end of line 28 and insert—

'(or the revocation of such an order), a placement order (or the revocation of such an order) or an order under section 25 (or the revocation or variation of such an order)'.

Photo of Michael Lord Michael Lord Deputy Speaker (Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendment No. 164.

Amendment No. 108, in clause 17, page 12, line 19, leave out "section 18 or".

Government amendments Nos. 166 to 169.

Amendment No. 109, in clause 18, page 13, line 1, leave out clause 18.

Government amendment No. 170.

Amendment No. 110, in clause 19, page 13, line 23, leave out from "the" to "may" in line 24 and insert—

'making of a placement order under section 20'.

Government amendments Nos. 111, 172 and 173.

Amendment No. 112, in clause 20, page 14, line 8, at end insert—

'or

(c) each parent or guardian consents to the making of the order.'.

Amendment No. 113, in page 14, line 9, after "order", insert—

'under paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2)'.

Amendment No. 114, in page 14, line 11, leave out paragraph (a).

Amendment No. 20, in page 14, line 17, leave out "section 23" and insert—

'sections 23 and 34(1) and (2)'.

Amendment No. 308, in page 14, line 17, after "23," insert "or 34(1) or (2)".

Government amendment No. 174.

Amendment No. 21, in clause 21, page 14, line 29, at end insert—

'or—

(e) the child has been returned to them due to the circumstances of section 34(1) and (2).'.

Amendment No. 309, in page 14, line 29, at end insert—

'(1A) A local authority must apply to the Court for a new placement order when a child has returned to them due to the circumstances described in section 34(1) or (2).'.

Government amendments Nos. 290, 175 and 176.

Amendment No. 116, in clause 23, page 15, line 33, leave out—

'each of the following conditions' and insert "the following condition".

Government amendment No. 177.

Amendment No. 115, in page 15, line 36, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c).

Government amendments Nos. 178 and 179.

Amendment No. 117, in clause 24, page 16, line 5, leave out paragraph (a).

Amendment No. 119, in clause 25, page 16, line 14, leave out clause 25.

Government amendment No. 291.

Amendment No. 118, in clause 28, page 18, line 5, leave out clause 28.

Government amendments Nos. 191 to 193.

Amendment No. 123, in clause 29, page 18, line 20, leave out from "is" to "a" in line 21 and insert—

'subject to a placement order'.

Amendment No. 128, in page 18, line 21, leave out "the prospective adopters" and insert—

'any placement made by the adoption agency.'.

Government amendment No. 195.

Amendment No. 124, in page 18, line 31, leave out subsections (3), (4), (5) and (6).

Government amendment No. 196.

Amendment No. 125, in clause 30, page 19, line 10, leave out clause 30.

Government amendments Nos. 198 to 201.

Amendment No. 126, in clause 31, page 19, line 30, leave out clause 31.

Government amendments Nos. 202 to 206.

Amendment No. 127, in clause 33, page 20, line 29, leave out clause 33.

Amendment No. 134, in clause 34, page 21, line 26, at end insert—

'( ) Where the actions described in subsections (1) or (2) are taken, any placement order in place at that time shall be revoked.'.

Government amendments Nos. 207 to 210, 250, 251, 220 and 230.

Photo of Jacqui Smith Jacqui Smith Minister of State, Department of Health

This large group of amendments deals with some of the Bill's most important provisions: clause 1 and the process for placement for adoption, which is set out in the initial clauses of chapter 3. It is worth emphasising that there are so many amendments not only because we are considering an important part of the Bill but because, given the Government's consultative approach through a Special Standing Committee, it was appropriate to respond through Government amendments to some of the anxieties that hon. Members and stakeholders raised.

I shall speak briefly to Government amendments Nos. 163 and 164. Government amendment No. 163 clarifies the important phrase

"coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child", which triggers the obligations on courts and adoption agencies that are set out in the provision. That also covers orders under clause 25 for contact while the child is placed, or the revocation or variation of those orders. Amendment No. 164 clarifies the position on consideration of the decision to dispense with parental consent. It makes it completely clear that the decisions on dispensing with consent should be governed by clause 50(1). Paragraph (b) provides for dispensing with consent if

"the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with."

That is a strong requirement.

It is worth reminding hon. Members that the aim of the placement system is to try to resolve the substantive issues that relate to parental consent to adoption earlier in the process. That will provide greater certainty and stability for children by dealing as far as possible with the bulk of issues before they are placed. It will reduce the extent to which birth families are faced with a fait accompli at the final adoption hearing, and try to reduce the uncertainty for prospective adopters who currently have to confront the possibility of a contested court hearing.

Chapter 3 provides two routes for placement for adoption: placement by parental consent under clause 18, and placement through a placement order under clauses 20 and 21. The second route is available only to local authorities. Some of the amendments try to remove placement by consent to ensure a court hearing in every case. Although I understand some of the anxieties behind the proposals, it is nevertheless wrong or unnecessary for reasons that I shall outline. First, the Bill ensures that there are considerable safeguards around parental consent. They include providing for the consent to be witnessed, taken by a CAFCASS officer and reported to the court. There is, therefore, court consideration of the nature of the consent.

Photo of Jonathan R Shaw Jonathan R Shaw Labour, Chatham and Aylesford

My hon. Friend rightly says that there has been some concern about these provisions. Does she understand that that is not least because once a person—a mother—makes the decision and crosses the line of consent, there is no going back, even if the circumstances where the child is placed change? For example, if the couple with whom the child is placed split up, the child's circumstances will become very different from those that pertained when the mother gave consent. Does my hon. Friend agree that requiring leave of the court would at least give confidence to people providing consent?

Photo of Jacqui Smith Jacqui Smith Minister of State, Department of Health

I do not accept my hon. Friend's view that there is no going back. In fact, it is important to stress that placement by consent is intended to be entirely voluntary. If the parents withdraw their consent before the final adoption order application is made, the child must be returned to them unless the local authority is under a duty to apply for a placement order. We have listened to the concerns about the removal provisions, in particular those relating to reducing the time limit for returning a child to a parent who has removed consent if that child is not placed, from 14 days to seven.

Photo of Mr Hilton Dawson Mr Hilton Dawson Labour, Lancaster and Wyre

I accept all that my hon. Friend is saying about the way in which the Government have listened to the important issues that have been raised on this complex and difficult part of the Bill. Does she accept that a huge range of children's organisations, as well as Labour Back Benchers, are still extremely concerned about these issues? There will obviously not be time to discuss them today, but will she please ensure that her officials and colleagues in the other place are open to further discussion on this important aspect of this important Bill?

Photo of Jacqui Smith Jacqui Smith Minister of State, Department of Health

Of course we have to continue to talk about these provisions. My officials have met—and undoubtedly will meet—people to talk about their concerns. I think it would be worth my while to spell out the changes that we have already made in response to those concerns. I have already talked about the removal provisions. We shall also ensure that local authorities apply for placement orders within the time limit rather than simply saying that they have a duty to do so. On revocation, we have recognised that the one-year test was too rigid, and we have reduced it.

I have to say to my hon. Friend, and to those who believe that placements should be made only through the court system, that one of the Government's major concerns is the practical issue of whether that would increase the number of court cases. We do not believe, given the safeguards that are in place, that that provision would be necessary. To give people some idea of the scale involved, 16 per cent. of children adopted out of care are currently adopted with consent. If the Government meet their targets, that could necessitate up to 600 extra court cases if we insisted that placement could be made only through the court system.

Photo of Julian Brazier Julian Brazier Opposition Whip (Commons)

I thank the Minister for giving way. We have no time at all to debate this important group of amendments. Does she accept that under the current provision, with the Government's amendments, a child could in theory be placed with families over and over again following disruptions prior to an adoption order, without any court overview or input of any kind from an independent representative for the child, such as a guardian ad litem?

Photo of Jacqui Smith Jacqui Smith Minister of State, Department of Health

I will come to that issue in a moment. I want to emphasise our concern about introducing the courts into the situation when we all believe that we need to bear down on delay.

Photo of Jacqui Smith Jacqui Smith Minister of State, Department of Health

No, I will not. I want to respond to the point made by Mr. Brazier. Conservative Members were concerned in their amendments about ensuring that placement orders were more specific. I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman's contention that we need to move away from the general placement order, which has received widespread support in consultations, to what I suspect he is suggesting—namely, the necessity to return to court every time a placement breaks down. That proposal does not recognise that a placement order is about determining whether placement for adoption is right for that child, rather than determining a particular placement. It would also ensure that delay would be brought into the system—the hon. Gentleman earlier rightly urged us to bear down on delay—because, by necessity, if a placement unfortunately broke down, instead of a local authority being able to place the child in another placement, it would have to return to court—

It being 3.45 pm, Mr. Deputy Speaker proceeded, pursuant to Order [this day] to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the proceedings to be concluded at that hour.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 164, in page 2, line 38, leave out paragraph (c).—[Jim Fitzpatrick.]