Trident Alternatives Review

Part of Business of the House – in the House of Commons at 7:30 pm on 17 July 2013.

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Photo of Danny Alexander Danny Alexander The Chief Secretary to the Treasury 7:30, 17 July 2013

No, I will not. I will give way later, but I want to make some progress first.

The review presents a much greater opportunity for change and the consideration of alternative postures, and that in turn presents the possibility of maintaining our nuclear deterrent capability with fewer submarines. This is where the real opportunity resides for making long-term savings, for recalibrating our policy to the requirements of our ages, and—as we just heard from my right hon. and learned Friend Sir Menzies Campbell—for contributing to nuclear disarmament.

Analysis of the national security strategy confirms the position adopted by successive Governments that

“no state currently has both the intent and the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the UK. But we cannot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge.”

With no hostile backdrop and a surprise attack against the UK highly unlikely, the United Kingdom could adopt a number of viable and credible alternative postures while maintaining a nuclear deterrence capability that meets the needs of national security.

The review demonstrates that our current nuclear posture of continuous-at-sea deterrence is not the only one available. Let me briefly describe four of the alternative postures that were considered in the review, from highest to lowest readiness. Each of them represents a different rung on the nuclear ladder, with CASD at the top.

A posture of focused deterrence would maintain a continuous nuclear deterrent for a specific period in response to a specific threat. At all other times, the system could adopt a reduced readiness level. We considered three options for reduced readiness. A so-called sustained-deterrence posture would mean regular patrols that maintained deterrence capability, but the number of platforms could be reduced. A responsive posture would allow gaps of irregular frequency and length between deployment, so that a potential adversary could not predict when and for how long a gap in deployment might occur. A posture of preserved deterrence would hold forces at low readiness. Under preserved deterrence, no platforms would be regularly deployed, but the UK would maintain the ability to deploy if the context changed.

The review clearly demonstrates that the concept of a ladder of nuclear capability and readiness is viable and credible, and that there is a number of options for taking steps down the rungs without getting off altogether.